

# THE TRUTH-CONDITIONAL CONTENT OF EVIDENTIALS IN SHABAKI

## **Abstract.**

Evidentials are those means by which any alleged fact whose truth is investigated is established or disproved. They indicate the source of evidence for the reality of a proposition. Languages differ greatly with respect to the sources of information they mark grammatically. In general, there are three subtypes of evidentiality: direct evidentiality, based on first-hand sensory evidence; indirect evidentiality, based on second- and third-hand evidence; and inferential evidentiality. The aim of this paper is to test the truth-conditional content of evidentials in Shabaki. The problem the paper will focus on concerns the interaction between evidentials and conditionals, negation, anaphors, tense and aspect. The corpus is based on the data excerpted from everyday communication in Shabaki. This language is classified as a modern Iranian northwest of the Indo-Iranian family spoken at north-east and south-east plateaus of Mosul, Iraq. The research questions include: Can evidentials be semantically embedded under conditionals and negation? How does evidential content affect anaphoric relations? And, do evidentials block

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anaphora in a way similar to modals in the absence of additional modal operators? The paper argues that evidentials are not a part of propositional (or at-issue) content. They can neither be semantically scoped under conditionals nor under negation. Besides, they do not behave like ordinary modals with respect to modal subordination. Modal subordination refers to the phenomenon of a modal being interpreted semantically subordinate to a modal in a preceding clause and it is best illustrated by anaphoric dependencies. It has been found that Shabaki can encode the three principal types of evidentials. Evidentials in Shabaki differ from modals in terms of their semantic behavior with respect to pronominal anaphors. They block anaphora in the absence of additional modal operators.

**Key words: Shabaki, evidentials, conditionals, negation, anaphora, modal subordination**

## 1 Introduction

Language is a social means of communication by which speakers not only transmit information but also seek to define their own attitude toward what they communicate. Speakers often comment

on the propositional content so as to guide the interlocutors to a reasonable interpretation of what is said or to weaken the statement in order not to undermine their own position. Since speakers want to avoid losing face, they often suggest that the proposition uttered is based on a certain mode of knowledge and also indicates how certain they are about the truth of the proposition. These two dimensions of communication point to evidentiality and epistemic modality. Evidentiality refers to the “encoding of the speaker’s (type of) grounds for making a speech act” (Faller, 2002: 2), while epistemic modality refers to the “evaluation of the chances that a certain hypothetical state of affairs under consideration (or some aspect of it) will occur, is occurring or has occurred in a possible world” (Nuyts, 2001: 21). Evidentials are those means by which any alleged fact whose truth is investigated is established or disproved. They indicate the source of evidence for the reality of a proposition.

Evidentiality is understood in both a narrow and a broad sense in the literature. According to Bybee’s (1985: 184), evidentials in their narrow sense “may be generally defined as markers that

indicate something about the source of the information in the proposition". Quite on the contrary, Chafe (1986: 262) uses the term "evidentiality" in its broadest sense and proposes that all evidential expressions "involve attitudes toward knowledge". This broad definition of evidentiality leads Chafe (1986: 262) to put evidential and epistemic modal qualifications under the same cover term "evidentiality", including expressions of belief; inductive expressions; sensory evidence; hearsay evidence; deductive expressions; hedges; and expectations.

This paper adopts a narrow view of evidentiality, viz. reference to knowledge with special attention to how it differs from epistemic modality. This narrow definition also implies a special focus on grammatical markers and grammaticalized evidential. Of interest to the present paper are de Haan (1999), Fitneva (2001), Faller (2002), and von Stechow & Gillies (2010) who believe that epistemic modality and evidentiality are two related but distinct grammatical categories.

The paper is set as follows: After introducing the topic in section 1, a brief note about Shabaki is presented in 2. The research methodology is explained in section 3. Sections 4 illustrates the

coding means of evidentiality in Shabaki. Section 5 present new data that has implications for how the evidentials in Shabaki should be analyzed and tested for their contribution in truth-conditionality. The data diagnosed in section 5 relates to scope under negation (5.1), the possibility of embedding in the antecedent of conditionals (5.2), embedding under factive verbs (5.3), scope under attitude predicates (5.4), their interaction with individual pronominal anaphors (5.5) and their challengeability and deniability (5.6). Section 6, finally, concludes.

## 2. Shabaki: an overview

The word 'Shabaki' is both the name of an ethnic group and the language that they speak. It is classified as a modern Iranian northwest of the Indo-Iranian family spoken at north-east and south-east plateau of Mosul (Sahl Nineveh), Iraq. In western research, Shabaki together with Zaza-Dimli, Gorani, Gaspian Dialects, South Dari and Hawramani are classified as a Zaza-Goran dialect of northwestern Kurdish language of the Indo-Iranian family. Another view claims that Shabak are the shabankara (or shawankara) Kurds of Fars district in Iran. Arab writers believe that the name

‘Shabaki’ is derived from the Arabic verb *shabaka*, ‘to intertwine, or interweave’, which reflects their view of Shabaki people as a community of heterogeneous origins held together by allegiance to a common *tariqa* (Sufi order) and to the same spiritual leaders (Vinogradov, 1974 & Bruinessen, 1998). Shabaki is an inflectional language with mainly but not exclusively SOV word order. Like Turkish, Japanese and Finnish, Shabaki is an agglutinating language where morphemes have single semantic meanings and they are simply connected linearly (*yâna.gal.mân*: house.s.our: our houses). It has borrowed a lot of lexical items from Arabic, Turkish and Kurdish.

### 3. Research methodology

#### 3.1. Research problems

One cross-linguistic characteristic of many evidentials that has been observed and tested by a number of linguists is that they cannot be semantically embedded. The evidential content always takes wide scope. This fact has been taken to show that evidential content cannot be truth-conditional and it is, therefore, a part of the not-at-issue content. The problem the paper will focus on concerns the interaction between evidentials and negation,

conditionals, factive verbs, attitude predicates, anaphors, challengeability and deniability.

#### 3.2. Research questions

The research questions include: Can evidentials be semantically embedded under conditionals, negation, factive verbs, and attitude predicates? How does evidential content affect anaphoric relations? Do evidentials block anaphora in a way similar to modals in the absence of additional modal operators? And finally, do they challenge questioning and denial?

#### 3.2. Research objectives and data

This paper seeks to test the predictions made by previous theories against data from Shabaki. It argues that evidentials are not part of propositional (at-issue) content of sentence. In addition to other characteristics, evidentials in Shabaki can neither be semantically scoped under conditionals nor under negation. Besides, they do not behave like ordinary modals with respect to modal subordination. The corpus is based on the data excerpted from everyday communication in Shabaki. The dialect examined in this paper is Ismaela-wand Shabaki.

#### 3.3. The semantic model

Based on the assumption that evidentiality is a category on its own, Willett (1988:57) has proposed three subtypes of evidentiality, i.e. a) direct evidentiality, based on first-hand sensory evidence, b) indirect evidentiality, based on second- and third-hand evidence (an equivalent of reportative evidence) and c) inferential evidentiality, i.e. evidentiality based on evidence by deduction or inference.<sup>1</sup>

#### 4. The encoding of evidentiality

In fact, there exist languages, equipped with so called 'grammatical evidentiality,' in which doing so is mandatory (Aikhenvald 2004). In these languages, evidentials are typically expressed by means of morphosyntactic items such as affixes, particles, clitics or special forms of verbs. By contrast, speakers of languages that do not encode evidentiality grammatically, having only lexical means at their disposal, may omit the evidential signal entirely. The evidentiality systems of different languages vary with respect to the number and types of information sources they discriminate.

There is a five-way evidential distinction in Shabaki between the unmarked and marked direct evidential (1.a and 1.b

respectively) and three overtly marked indirect evidentials: the reportative (1.c), a restricted reportative (1.d) (also called the narrative) and the conjectural (1.e), which is morphologically complex.<sup>2 & 3</sup>

(1) a. (Mâç-i ban-at) warân-â.

(say-1SG+PRES to-2SG) rain-INPF+PRES

'I assure you that it is raining.'

(1) b. Tit-am warân-â.

See-1SG+PRES rain-INPF+PRES

'I saw it is raining.'

(1) c. Aşnaft-am warân-â.

Hear-1SG+PRES rain-INPF+PRES

'I have heard it is raining.'

(1) d. Mâç-â warân-â.

Say-3SG+PRESrain-INPF+PRE(Clear-BE.PRES) FUT.rain.become.3SG.LV

'Evidently, it is going to rain.'

#### 5. Tests for truth-conditionality

In semantics and pragmatics, the question whether evidentials contribute to propositional content or whether they constitute a comment by the speaker on that content paved the way for the emergence of two important distinctions.

First, it is standardly assumed that there is a distinction between truth-conditional content (e.g. entailment) and non-truth-conditional content (e.g. presupposition and implicature). In the past, various tests for truth-conditionality have been proposed, among them embeddability in the antecedent of conditionals and under factive verbs, challengeability and scope interaction with propositional-level operators like negation (cf. Faller, 2002). None of these tests is without controversy, but embeddability in the antecedent of conditionals is often taken to be the most reliable.

Another, more recent distinction is made between at-issue content (the “main point” of the utterance) and not-at-issue content (in some sense “secondary” to the main point). Ever growing evidence that those two distinctions do not characterize the same two classes of meaning: Non-truth-conditional content is typically not at-issue. But truth-conditional content can come in two flavors, as at-issue or not-at-issue (Potts, 2005; Murray, 2010; and AnderBois et al. 2013).

According to Murray (2010), every sentence has three potential contributions:

1. The at-issue content: it is directly challengeable, up for negotiation, and a proposal to update “common ground”.

2. The not-at-issue restriction: it directly updates to the common ground with the not-at-issue proposition  $q$ . Not-at-issue content is not directly challengeable, not up for negotiation, and automatically added to “common ground”.

3. The illocutionary relation: it relates the at-issue content to the context: proposes to update the common ground with the at-issue proposition  $p$ , structures the common ground with respect to  $p$ . Common ground is the information the participants take for granted (or act as if they do) for the sake of conversation.

Building on analyses of evidentials in other languages, such as Murray (2010) analysis of Cheyenne, I present an investigation of (*not*-)at-issue content Shabaki evidential sentences. In this section, I use some tests such as scope interaction with propositional-level operators (negation), embeddability in the antecedent of conditionals and under factive sentences; and challengeability (can the content be directly assented or dissented with?) in an attempt to prove

that evidentials are not truth-conditional (i.e., not-at-issue) in Shabaki.

### 5.1. Scope interaction: under negation

When a clause contains more than one scope-taking element, the question always arises as to what determines their relative scope relations, especially when these scope relations are not reflected by their surface order. Aikhenvald (2004: 256) observes that “in many languages the information source cannot be negated”. If a non-firsthand evidential is negated, the scope of the negation is on the verb phrase and not the clause. Accordingly, the evidential falls outside the scope domain of the negative marker.

(3) a. Aşnaft-am kat-â nasâ.

Hear-PST-1SG fall-PST+3SG sick

‘I heard he was sick.’

(3) b. Ina dro-na, kas inaş na-wât.

This lie-PRES, nobody this no-say+PST

#‘That’s not true. Nobody said that.’

Evidentiality always scopes outside of negation.

(4) a. Wât-aş Ali na-lawâ Baḏdâ hâro.

Say-3SG Ali no-go+PST Baghdad

today

‘He said, ‘Ali did not go to Baghdad today.’

(i) The speaker has reportative evidence that Ali did not go to Baghdad today.

(ii) # The speaker does not have reportative evidence that Ali did not go to Baghdad today. .

(4) b. Na-wât-aş Ali na-lawâ Baḏdâ hâro.

No-say-3SG Ali no-go+PST Baghdad today

# ‘He did not say, ‘Ali went to Baghdad today.’

In (4a), the evidential content associated with the evidential clitic ‘na’ scopes over the negation; the sentence can never mean that the speaker lacks evidence for the propositional content of the sentence.

### 5.2. Embeddability in the antecedent of conditionals

Embedding Shabaki evidentials in the antecedent of a conditional is grammatical as in (5) with the reportative.

(5) Aga Ahmad law-â yâna dede-ş, na-da-ş xalât.

If ahmad go-PST+3SG home aunt-POSS, no-give-3SG present

'If Ahmad visited his aunt, don't give a present.'

However, evidentials in Shabaki can occur in the consequent of conditionals, as with the conjectural in (6) and the reportative in (7). However, in these examples, the evidential is no longer embedded: the scope of the evidential is the main clause.

(6) Madâm mândan-me, ma-tâw-me bişme çigarageşâyê.

'Since we are tired, we can sit for a while.'

(7) Aga wâtşân banam Ahmad naqu bayo, yani naqu bayo.

Proposition = 'If I was told that Ahmad will come, then he will come.'

Evidential contribution = speaker was told that Ahmad will come

Example (7) is used to illustrate that the evidential requirement cannot be blocked. The entire sentence in (7) requires that the speaker was told that Ahmad will come, though it is pragmatically odd. Crucially, in both (6) and (7), the evidential takes scope over the entire conditional. According to Faller (2002), the 'evidential indicates the source of information for the conditional

relation and the consequent.'

(8) a. Aşnaft-am aga Ali bale-ş bazaar, gi bâr-o meway çani heş.

Hear-1SG+PST if Ali go-3SG market, would bring-3SG fruits with him

'I heard if Ali had gone to the market, he would have brought fruits with him.'

b. Gi nâqçe n-orgel-o bazaar.

He gain NEG-return-3SG market

'He would not have gone back to the market again.'

c. [Aga Ali bal-eş bazaar u bâr-eş meway çani heş] gi nâqçe n-orgel-o.

[if Ali go-3SG+PST market and bring-3SG+PST fruits with him] gain NEG-return-3SG market

'If Ali had gone to the market and brought fruits] he would not have gone back again.'

(9). Aşnaft-am aga mago-t bakati gada diyat, garak mânda-bo awal.

Heard-1SG+PST if want-2SG live on spree, would tired-become first

'I heard, 'if one wants to live on spree, one would do his best first.'

In (8 and 9), the evidentials have scope

over the entire conditional. In (8), the speaker heard that Ali bought fruits if he went to the market. In (9), the speaker heard that one will get tired if he wants to be happy. This would lead one to expect that the inferred evidential can also be found in overtly realized conditional constructions—an expectation that is borne out by the empirical evidence. As is well known, conditional clauses express quantification over event types as well as possible scenarios in some imaginary world.

### 5.3. Embedability under factive verbs

In Shabaki, the cognitive verb 'zâni' (infer or come to conclusion) is used to express evidence which is inferred by the speaker. Consider the sentence in (10a).

(10) a. Zân-im muhandas-â.

Know+PST-1SG engineer+BE+PST-3SG

I came to know (inferred) that she was an engineer.

'Zân' in the previous section has been regarded as a grammaticalized epistemic form in which no reference is made to an evidential source of information. Sentence (10a) expresses direct evidential which

may take on inferential value based on reasoning or assumption 'I came to the conclusion that x.' in (10b), the speaker claims that he knows 'how bad Ali is' because of the long sad experience he has with him.

(10) b. Mazâ-ni Ali çi marka-n-a.

Know-1SG+PRES Ali what type-BE-PRES

'I know how bad Ali is.'

### 5.4. Scope under propositional attitude predicates

Languages vary in whether they allow evidential markers in embedded contexts or not. Some languages such as, Cheyenne or Cuzco Quechua allow evidentials under attitude predicates; others do not, e.g. Bulgarian, German, or Japanese (Sauerland and Schenner 2007). Propositional attitude predicates can express attitudes that convey information about the nature of evidence for a statement (he saw that ..., I infer that ...).

The form 'wât-şân' (so people said), which denotes a quotative, can be attached to any sentence. It is most frequently used in relating past events. The quotative morpheme 'mâç-â' (so they

say) in Shabaki is used in relating present or future events. This particle consists of the verb stem 'mâç-' (to say) and the third person plural suffix '-â' (they). An example is shown in (11). When 'mâç-â' does not refer to the 3<sup>rd</sup> person plural can not exactly specify the information source as in the following sentence.

(11) Mâç-â zame larz-â ça amrika.

Say.PRES.3PL earth shake.PST.1SG  
in America.

'They say there was an earthquake in America.'

The present passive verb form 'mâç-inyo' (it is alleged, so people say) in (12) and the prepositional phrase 'sar qasa-l' (according to rumors) in (13) mark quotations in the third person singular or plural. They are used when the speaker hides the identity of the 3<sup>rd</sup> person information source. The clitic marker '–inyo' in (12) is used to construct the passive construction in Shabaki. Therefore, the information source is not specified.

(12) Mâç-in-yo zame larz-ân ça Amrika.

Say+PRES-3SG-PASS earth  
shake+PST-PERF+1SG in America.

'It is said that there was an earthquake

in America.'

(13) Sar qasa-i, dadâ-ş şış kard.

Upon the talk-DEF, grandma-  
POSS+3SG marriage do+PST

According to the rumor, his grandma married.

As it has become clear from the above examples, the modal import seems to rely on the speaker's specification of what has been reported to him that implies the reliability of information. 'sar qasa-i' in (13) does not exactly specify the information source and therefore it is a mere hearsay. Shabaki seems not to allow evidentials under predicates. In sentence (13), it is not embedding but quotation because of the impossibility of bound anaphora into such clauses.

If the markers can occur below an attitude operator, the evidential information should not be repeated as part of the complement proposition. In contrast, if the marker occurs in the matrix clause, only then the modified proposition should be asserted, and there is no commitment with respect to the underlying proposition to be true. (14-a) does not commit the speaker to the fact that his grandma married, but only to the fact that Ali said so. In contrast,

(14-b) commits the speaker to the truth of the proposition that Ali has said that it is raining - not to the proposition that Ali has said that according to some x (or according to himself) it was raining.

(14) a. Sar qasa Ali, 'naqu warân bo.'

On Ali's words, grandma.GEN.3SG will rain fall

'According to Ali's speech, 'it will rain.'

(14) b. Ali Wât-aş bana-m: 'naqu warân bo.'

Ali Say.PST.3SG.NOM to.1SG.ACC: 'will raining fall.'

'Ali told me: 'it will rain.'

### 5.5. Modal subordination (pronominal anaphora)

Modal subordination refers to the phenomenon of a modal being interpreted semantically subordinate to a modal in a preceding clause and it is best illustrated by anaphoric dependencies. The reportative can be treated as anaphoric source because of its interpretation in discourse. While the source of the report can remain unspecified, it may also be interpreted anaphorically. In other words, the source of the report can be taken to be someone mentioned in previous discourse.

(15) a. Bâbo-m xâbar-aş kard uzera.

Father-POSS+1SG call-3SG do+PST yesterday

'My father called yesterday.'

b. [Wât-aş] brâ-t trombel-aş taqlaş ward.

[say-3SG+PST] brother-2SG car-3SG crash do+PST

'[He said] my brother had a car crash.'

c. # Brâ-t trombel-aş taqlaş ward.

Brother-2SG car-3SG crash do+PST

'My brother had a car crash.'

The reportative evidential 'wâtaş' in (15b) is interpreted anaphorically – the source of the report that 'My brother had a car crash' is taken to be my father from (15a). Since the speaker only has reportative evidence that his brother had a car crash, not using the reportative evidential, as in (15c), is infelicitous. The use of (15c) is infelicitous in this context because sentences in Shabaki without an overt evidential commit the speaker to having direct evidence for the evidential's scope. Moreover, the sentence in (15) demonstrates that reportatives do not shift indexicals. In (15b), 'my brother' is

interpreted as the speaker's brother, not the bother of the source of the report (i.e., the speaker's father).

The conjectural evidential can also be anaphoric to previous discourse. For the reportative, it was the source of the report that was anaphoric. For the conjectural, it is the source of – or evidence for – the inference.

(16) a. Goşt na-giryâ bi.

Meat NEG-rare be+PST

'The meat was rare.'

b. Lâzam ğâz fad biyâ.

Must gazjar finish-PST

'The gaz jar must have finished.'

In (16), the speaker concludes from the fact that 'the meat was rare' in (16a) that 'the gaz jar must have finished' in (16b). The speaker of (16) only has conjectural evidence that 'the gaz jar must have finished'. It is thus infelicitous to omit the conjectural [lâzam] in the second sentence, as shown in (17).

(17) a. Goşt na-giryâ bi.

Meat NEG-rare be+PST

'The meat was rare.'

b. # Ğâz fad biyâ.

Gazjar finish-PST

'The gaz jar finished.'

The use of (17b) is infelicitous in this very situation because it commits the speaker to having direct evidence that 'the gaz jar finished.' However, it would be felicitous if, for example, the speaker had seen the gaz jar finished. Evidentials in Shabaki differ from modals in terms of their semantic behavior with respect to pronominal anaphors. They block anaphora in the absence of additional modal operators.

## 5.6. Challengeability and deniability (assent/ dissent)

If an element can be questioned, doubted, rejected or accepted, it contributes to the propositional content of the speech act; otherwise, it should be taken as an illocutionary force indicator. This section attempts to test which components of a sentence are directly challengeable and which are not, and what the speaker is committed to. The consensus is that there is a basic distinction between the contribution of the evidential and the contribution of the proposition, the latter of which is the main point of the sentence. The proposition is

directly challengeable, while the evidential contribution is not. The speaker's level of commitment to the proposition can vary. However, the speaker is invariably committed to the evidential contribution. Evidence for the basic distinction between the contribution of the evidential and the contribution of the proposition comes from the challengeability test, also called the assent/dissent test (Papafragou 2006).

(18) a. Mâç-â zame larz-â ça Hawler.

Say+PRES-3PL earth shake+PST-1SG in Irbil.

'They say there was an earthquake in Irbil.'

*P*: there was an earthquake in Irbil.

Evidential: speaker was told that *p*

b. Ina râst-â?

This right-BE+PRES

'Is this true?'

c. Ina râst-na-wâ. Zame larz-â ça Basra.

This true-Neg-Be-PRES. Earth shake. PST.1SG in Basra.

'This is not true. There was an earthquake in Basra.'

d. Ina râst-na-wâ. Ina na-wâçinyâ bana-t.

This true-Neg-Be-PRES. This NEG-say-PST-PASS to-2SG

'This is not true. You were not told this.'

The question in (18b) can only target the proposition of (18a), that 'there was an earthquake in Irbil' it cannot question the evidential contribution. That is, the question is akin to 'Is it true that there was an earthquake in Irbil?' and not 'Is it true that you heard that there was an earthquake in Irbil?' Similarly, following up with 'this is not true' can only challenge the main proposition, as in (18c), and not the evidential itself, as shown by (18d). The propositional anaphor in 'This is not true' cannot pick out the evidential contribution. It is clear that in example (18) the report in the proposition is challenged and not the fact that there was a report, i.e. the evidential contribution.

According to Murray (2010), challenging evidentiality results in contradiction, distinct from infelicity. (19) makes two explicit incompatible commitments.

(19) a. # Tit-am law-â kêr çâştagâ, bas am na-titam.

See+PAST-3PL go+PAST-3SG work at dawn but nobody NEG-see+PAST

'I saw he went to work at dawn, but I didn't saw that.'

b. # Tit-an-şân lawâ kâr çâştagâ, bas kas na-titaş.

See.PAST.3PL go.PAST.3SG work at dawn but nobody NEG-see.PAST

'They saw he went to work at dawn, but nobody saw that.'

In (19), it is infelicitous for the speaker to deny that he saw that he went to work at dawn. (19) is not merely infelicitous but is also intuitively contradictory. According to Faller (2002), the propositional content of the first conjunct of (19) (that he went to work at dawn) is compatible with the propositional content of the second conjunct (that the speaker did not saw that he went to work at dawn). In fact, for Faller (2002), the only thing asserted by (19) is the propositional content of the second conjunct. However, it is my impression that (19) is more than just insincere - it is a contradiction. Examples like this suggest that the evidential contribution affects the truth conditions of a sentence. Faller (ibid.) calls examples like (19) an evidential version of Moore's paradox. In Murray's (2010) point of view, this is a misnomer. She believes that in standard

Moore's paradox sentences, e.g., It's raining but I don't believe it, the second conjunct conflicts with something which is not properly part of the first conjunct, e.g., a norm of assertion. However, in sentences like (19), the second conjunct conflicts with a morpheme in the first conjunct, i.e. the evidential. Moore's paradox sentences can be true, but not be felicitously asserted - they are pragmatically odd, but not contradictions. Sentences like (19) can never be true. A closer English parallel with (19) would be It's raining, I believe, but I don't believe it, which is clearly a contradiction and not merely Moore's paradox.

## 6. Conclusions

The central claim of this paper is that evidentiality grammaticizes a distinction between at-issue content and not-at-issue content. The at-issue content is the main point of the sentence and the not-at-issue content is the evidential contribution, which is directly added to the common ground. This is supported by data from Shabaki. Evidentials take a wide scope with respect to another, including negation, anaphora, conditionals, modal subordination, attitude predicates, and embedding factive verbs. The evidential component of Shabaki

evidentials is not deniable.

These tests confirm that evidential contribution is part of not-at-issue content and thus are not a part of truth-conditional propositional content. Moreover, Shabaki can encode the three principal types of evidentials (sensory, reportative and conjectural). Like other languages, Shabaki makes use of perfect morphology to encode indirect source of information, such as perfective enclitic –an, imperfective proclitic gi- and a few tense markers.

## Notes

1. For more about the classification of evidentials, the reader can see Givón(1982), Willet (1988), Aikhenvald (2004) , and de Haan (2005).

2. Â â as in *apple*; A a as in *about*; Ç ç as in *church*; Ş ş as in *shoe*; Ž ž as in *vision*; X x as in *Loch* (in Scottish). The voiceless uvular fricative in English, Ġ ġ, corresponds a voiced uvular fricative in Shabaki. The voiced and the voiceless pharyngeal fricatives replace *a* and *h* in some Shabaki words respectively. The last two sounds were borrowed from Arabic.

3. The abbreviations for the glosses and attributes used in this paper are **1** = First person, **2** = Second person, **3** =

Third person, **ACC** = Accusative, **AUX** = Auxiliary, **CONJ** = Conjunction, **DAT** = Dative, **DEF** = Definite, **Ez(afe)** = A morpheme used to express relation, **FUT** = Future, **GEN** = Genitive, **IMPF** = Imperfective, **IND** = Indefinite, **INF** = Infinitive, **LV** = Light verb, **LVC** = Light verb construction, **NEG** = Negation, **NOM** = Nominal, **ONO** = onomatopoeic, **PASS** = passive construction, **PERF** = perfect, **PL** = Plural, **PRST** = Present, **PST** = Past, **SG** = Singular, **VP** = Verbal phrase, - morpheme boundary, + fused morpheme.

## References

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