THE ROLE OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT AND INSTITUTION MARJAAAT
IN COUNTERING EXTREMISM

Professer Nikita Filin

Radicalism and extremism threaten the security of many countries. Among the various aspects of this phenomenon, its ideological side is of particular importance. On the whole, Sharia and Islamic jurisprudence by their nature openly oppose international terrorism. The decisions of the leading centers of Islamic legal thought reject the ideology of the radicals.

To solve the problem of extremism, the interaction of various institutions, both state and public and religious, is necessary. The limited number of leaders who can lead the masses to traditional Islam has caused a large number of young people to leave their homes and go to war on the side of various terrorist groups. In this regard, we are convinced that the role of Islamic thought and the institution of religious mentoring (marjaata) in countering extremism is very important. The authority of mentors and their ability to influence the political environment is evidenced by a number of examples from history and modernity. Among them, Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Sistani's publication of a fatwa in June ٢٠١٤, calling on Iraqi citizens to defend the country, its people and holy places from militants; conviction by high-ranking clergymen

(Shoberi Zanjani, Safi Golpayegani, Mousavi Ardebili, Makarem Shirazi, Jafar Sobhani, Yousef Sanei) of crimes committed by extremist groups; calls for Shiite and Sunni leaders to establish a dialogue between the followers of these two directions, and others. Over the entire period of its existence, mankind has sought to form an ideal model of interaction between various groups, both in the field of public interests and in the spiritual sphere. However, often the search for a path of peaceful coexistence led to the emergence of extreme ideas and due to the desire to prove superiority.

views of representatives of one group over another. The rapid pace of development of modern society, along with the processes of globalization that determined the openness of nations and nationalities, on the one hand, contribute to the achievement of progress in various fields, on the other - cause the development and active dissemination of extremist sentiments. Extremism today, of course, is one of the most serious national and transnational threats. In its various manifestations, it carries a danger to the integrity of the country and its citizens, regardless of their national, religious, linguistic, social, or racial affiliation. The main feature of extremism is ideology, that is, a system of ideas and attitudes that are extreme or radical and manifest in intolerance towards carriers of other values. Extremism can be described as one person's activity or

groups of people, far from the norms, order and rules accepted in society. Meanwhile, the definition of the norm is often of a subjective political nature, which complicates the identification of extremist actions. Another difficulty arising in the way of combating this phenomenon is connected with the idea of justice: for some people, actions of an extremist orientation may often seem fair, perpetrated for the good purpose, while representatives of opposing views directly associate such activities with crime. However, it should be clarified: people who resort to extremism do not always use violence to achieve their goals, and the results of their efforts are not necessarily negative, which is clear if we consider this phenomenon from the point of view of excessiveness, extremes in any activity. Thus, in themselves, actions regarded as extremism can be used, in particular, to draw attention to a pressing social or political problem. However, in this report, extremism is seen as calls for violence, the struggle aimed at inciting hatred towards the opposite side. Most often, the studied phenomenon is divided into several main categories: political, national, racial, and religious. At the same time, from the point of view of the influence of the institute of spiritual mentoring - marjaat - on preventing the manifestation of extremist sentiments in society, the religious variety is of particular interest. This type is most dangerous for countries or particular areas with a multi-

faith population. The main tasks of the state and society, aimed at preventing the development of religious extremism, experts include the following:

he normalization of the political situation in the country;

-the formation of the spirit of social peace, tranquility;

- preventing political, interethnic and interfaith conflicts, social disagreements in society;

- identification and gradual elimination of the causes and conditions conducive to the emergence and spread of religious extremism;

- raising the cultural and educational level of the population, the study of religion, history, culture and traditions;

-increase interfaith understanding;

-the formation of tolerance between ethno-confessional formations;

- opposition to the involvement of citizens in religious extremist groups, communities, organizations;

- countering the dissemination of information and literature, extremist materials aimed at inciting interfaith conflicts;

-the development of recommendations for the improvement of the activities of subjects of counteraction to extremist activities for the prevention of religious extremism, the improvement of methods

and technologies for their interaction with public and religious associations.

Islamic extremism in this context is a particularly interesting topic; Moreover, an analysis of the causes of its manifestation (including among Muslim youth) is important for understanding the problem as a whole. This kind of extremism is motivated by the interpretation of Islam, in which the Shari'ah acts as the only comprehensive religious and political system. The establishment of the power of an Islamic state in all countries with a predominantly Muslim population, and ultimately throughout the world, is the ultimate goal pursued by Islamic extremists who reject in this regard any manifestations of democracy, as well as human rights. They are convinced that they are acting in the name of justice and freedom. To achieve the main goal requires the elimination of non-Muslim armed forces from Muslim territories, as well as the overthrow of the regimes of opponents.

Extremists, using Holy Scripture, tend to impose their religious views on representatives of other religions, often through violence and cruelty. The main stumbling block is the interpretation of the texts of the Quran, which call on Muslims to fight the enemies of Allah.

Over the centuries, Islamic political and legal thought has accumulated a multitude of ideas and ideas on all key issues that

are directly related to modern terrorism. In particular, they concern the interpretation of the foundations of power and law, the interrelations of the state and the individual, the status of the pagans and relations with non-Muslim countries, the justification of permissible methods of political struggle. The main specific prescriptions of Islam on these issues were formulated on the basis of ijtihad - a rational search for solutions to issues not resolved in the Qur'an and Sunnah, or the interpretation of allowing for different understanding of the provisions of these sources. The few rules of war that they had or relations with the Gentiles formed in the initial period of the emergence of Islam as a religion and state, of its intense rivalry with political ideological opponents. As a result, many of these norms reflect realities that remain in the distant past, but modern Islamic thought cannot ignore them. Some of them, most often taken out of the historical context of their formation, are nowadays often used to justify political extremism, intolerance and cruelty.

Islamic extremists are convinced that they have the right to create violence against those who do not obey the will of Allah, including Muslims who do not share their views. To justify such a right, the well-known concept is used, in particular, according to which a Muslim is obliged to encourage everyone to follow what is established by sharia as mandatory or encouraged and prevent the

commission of something prohibited by them. Finally, one of the central places in the ideological platform of the supporters of terrorism under Islamic slogans is the concept of non-recognition of any authority deviating from the sharia regulations. It is important to emphasize that the terrorists refuse to recognize the power belonging not only to the wrong, but also to the Islamic rulers, if the latter, in their opinion, deviate from the Shari'a.

An analysis of traditional and modern Islamic thought leads to the conclusion that a prominent place in it is occupied by principles that reject radicalism. These values in Islamic jurisprudence can be found convincing justification. It is not by chance that modern Muslim thinkers come to the conclusion that the postulates that play the role of the ideological basis of terrorism under the name of Islam, are contrary to the general meaning of the Shari'a. The main thing in it is the comprehension of its main objectives, the comparison of the damage and benefits that the practical implementation of the provisions of the Koran and Sunna can bring. Given this sharia's orientation, authoritative representatives of modern Islamic thought refute extremist views precisely by Islamic legal arguments. This, above all, concerns jihad, which the Islamic thought interprets in different ways. Muslim jurists distinguish the narrow and widespread meaning of jihad. In the narrow sense, jihad means the rules of war developed by Islamic

legal thought and the legal consequences of its termination. This is how traditional traditional fiqh jihad understood - as an Islamic science about the rules of people's external behavior, reducing it to the rules of preparation and conduct of hostilities. The attitude towards jihad in general in fiqh is reproduced in general by modern Islamic legal thought. It should also be borne in mind that the traditional fiqh proceeded from the possibility of waging war only against non-Muslims. Therefore, the widespread, albeit incorrect, definition of jihad as a "holy war against the infidels" should not be surprising. And the practice of terrorists, who call their actions jihad, would seem to confirm the correctness of such an understanding of it. At the same time, modern Islamic thought, analyzing the meaning of this phenomenon taking into account all the provisions of Sharia, understands it much more widely. Jihad, in general, refers to efforts aimed at the implementation of the commandments of Allah in a variety of ways, up to the assertion of Islam by armed means. Within the framework of such an understanding, modern Muslim jurists identify two main variants of jihad - the so-called preaching and military (armed). The first implies, as the Muslims say, addressed to all people "a call to embark on the path of Allah." It includes the promotion of Islamic truths, as well as any efforts aimed at self-improvement and building a true Islamic society, based not on literally following the

provisions of Sharia, but mainly on implementing its leading principles, values and goals. Moreover, preaching jihad excludes any violence against non-Muslims. In other words, jihad is by no means reduced to war, although it can also be in the form of hostilities, which is its second option. In this regard, the question arises about the grounds for the legitimate use of armed force: is the goal of military action a reflection of aggression and the protection of Muslims, or are they intended, as Muslim radical preachers believe, to combat unbelief and spread Islam by means of weapons?

The approach of Islamic thought to this issue is not different unity. In it, indeed, there were and there are currents who consider the struggle against unbelief to be a sufficient justification for the use of armed force. This view is shared by the current Muslim terrorists. However, modern Islamic thought interprets armed jihad in a different spirit. Based on the systematic interpretation of Sharia norms, modern Islamic thought understands jihad as an admission of armed violence only under one condition - in the case of aggression. Naturally, one of the leading forms of jihad is the use of armed force. According to the overwhelming majority of Muslim jurists, this is permissible only as a defensive means to repel aggression. It is extremely important to bear in mind that only the use of force that does not pursue personal gain, is not

aimed at achieving interests of a national or ethnic character, is not aimed at seizing property or territory is considered legitimate armed jihad. Jihad in the exact sense can be called only those actions that are taken in order to assert Islamic values and their protection from external encroachment.

At the same time, military jihad cannot be carried out in the interests of compulsion to faith, the adoption of Islam. In modern Islamic thought, the viewpoint about the inadmissibility of the deprivation of life of non-Muslims only because of their disbelief prevails. There is no doubt that the actions of terrorists claiming the only correct understanding of the Shari'a do not meet this demand, since they not only ignore the arguments, but also openly violate the rules for conducting combat operations formulated by most interpretations of fiqh. According to Islamic norms, collective responsibility for acts of terror should be borne by all persons involved in them, and not only their direct perpetrators. The fact is that, according to Sharia, jihad is permissible only by order of the Imam-ruler. Therefore, political leaders - direct commanders and, above all, the supreme leader - cannot deny themselves responsibility for the evil perpetrated by the criminals. Contrary to the claims of Islamic extremists, they do not serve Islam, but bring it harm. By forming a negative image of Islam and Muslims through their actions, spreading it around the world, they

put at risk the highest value protected by sharia - religion. Therefore, there are significantly more reasons to call jihad not terrorist attacks under the slogans of Islam, but the fight against their performers, organizers and inspirers in defense of Islam and Muslims.

The views of the ideologists of Islamic extremism contradict the position of modern Islamic thought on other points as well. This, in particular, concerns the approach to the state, the legitimate institutions of government. Ibn Taymiyya argued that the "affairs makers" are precisely the rulers and scholars. The establishment of the order in the affairs of Allah depends on their consistent fulfillment of their mission. Moreover, in this alliance, scientists have a special role, because the authorities should apply to their knowledge every time when they are not able to find the right answer in the Quran and Sunnah or face issues on which these sources do not provide ready-made solutions.

Developing this idea, a student of Ibn Teimiyyah, a major Islamic thinker Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah (١٢٩٢–١٣٥٠) emphasized: "Indeed, those who know are the heirs of the Prophets. After all, the Prophets did not leave behind either a dinar or a dirham, but left a legacy of knowledge ... Connoisseurs of Islam (faqihs) on earth - akin to the stars in the sky, illuminating the way for those who wander in darkness. " As a result, he came to the following

conclusion: "The authorities are worthy of obedience to the extent that they do things in accordance with knowledge; therefore, submission to the emirs follows the obedience of the scientists themselves, for the authorities must obey within the limits prescribed by Allah and what science dictates; in turn, obedience to those who know is due to their strict obedience to the Messenger. " This thesis is the essence of the approach of Islam to the ratio of divine revelation, knowledge and power, which gives knowledge the place of an intermediary between the Shari'ah and the actions of the rulers.

To consider the slightest deviation from the detailed external rules of worldly behavior, formulated hundreds of years ago, without thinking about their meaning, to be a matter of apostasy, is to give means for the purpose and not to catch the main thing in the Shari'a. Fanatics professing such an approach, noted al-Jawziyya, cannot be counted as knowledgeable. In his opinion, no mujtahid has the right to give his opinion for the will of Allah, and the imposition of perceptions that distort the true nature of Sharia is comparable to the judgment of Allah and his precepts without knowing what is strongly condemned by the Quran. At Imam Al-Bukhari we find the Hadith with the words of the Prophet Muhammad: "Allah does not hold onto himself knowledge, pulling him out of people's hearts, but keeps it in the hands of

scientists; if there is no scientist left, people will take for themselves the leaders of ignorant people who, in response to questions addressed to them, will make decisions without reliance on knowledge, mistaken themselves and misleading others.

However, Islamic radicals do not think about the meaning of the Shari'ah prescriptions, refer only to those of them that correspond to their initial premises. In the same way, they choose from the whole great Islamic heritage, including that left by Ibn Teimiyah, who enjoys special prestige among extremists, that which confirms their own vision of Islam and Sharia.

The most important goal of religious extremism is the violent forcing society to follow the chosen system of religious beliefs; therefore, the religion component itself should be considered only as one of the instruments of political struggle. Therefore, when analyzing this phenomenon, it is not entirely correct to say only that it is directed exclusively against other confessions. So, in the relationship between Shiites and Sunnis, there are also a large number of problems that often impede constructive dialogue. In this regard, it is necessary to emphasize that a number of Muslim leaders strive to solve these problems. In particular, in ٢٠٠٨, Ayatollah Hussein Wahid Khorasani issued a fatwa in which he forbade Shiites from accusing Sunnis of kufr (unbelief). He argues: "You can not curse and insult their [Sunni] authorities, this

may cause them to distance themselves from the Family of the Prophet (SAS) and their teachings." In addition, the theologian states that the Shiites should be assisted by the Sunnis, if the latter are in a quandary. Thus, although the confrontation between Sunnis and Shiites has continued for more than ١,٣٠٠ years, religious leaders who disagree with this position consider it their duty to convey their vision to followers. In this regard, it would be appropriate to consider the problem of combating religious extremism from the point of view of the role of religious mentoring. The emergence of this institution brings us back to the process of the formation of the Shiite trend of Islam and is associated with the period of great concealment of the ١٢th Imam Mahdi that began in ٩٤١. If at first, as follows from dogma, the hidden imam kept in touch with people by means of four governors, then in the future the role of the spiritual leaders of the Shiites was assumed by representatives of the clergy who had previously broadcast the blameless ideas. They were addressed many questions arising from the period of great concealment. First of all, it was necessary to determine who will now perform the tasks previously assigned to immaculate imams, because the latter were the spiritual guides and mentors of Muslims.

The beginning of the rule of the Safavids (١٥٠١–١٧٢٢, ١٧٢٩–١٧٣٦) **is marked by the fact that the Shiites cease to be an**

oppressed minority, the rulers and the clergy are drawing closer. During this period, between Shiite theologians and the Safavid Padishah, there is a tacit division of responsibilities. Shari'a questions, such as judging, fall under the authority of theologians, and common affairs, such as security and politics, are the responsibility of the rulers.

With the advent of Qajars (١٧٩٥–١٩٢٥) to power, the interaction weakened, but the strong ties of the rulers with the clergy, caused by the need to recognize religious legitimacy and public approval, remained. By this time, Shiite theologians began to have a great social influence, and also strengthened the role of their seminaries. Russian-Persian War of ١٨٠٤–١٨١٣ became a pretext for activating the clergy in the manifestation of their own political power. Theologians considered the struggle against the oppression within the country and foreign aggression as their duty. For example, Sheikh Jahafar al-Gita, known as Sheikh Jaafar Najafi, who has the highest spiritual title "Marja at-Taklid", issued a fatwa calling for jihad against foreign intervention.

The institute of mentoring, close to the species that we know now, was born in the XIX century. and was presented in the concept of Sheikh Murtaza Ansari. The events of the Qajar times associated with the war with Russia in ١٨٢٦–١٨٢٨, the massacre in the Russian embassy in Tehran on February ١١, ١٨٢٩, the tobacco

protests of ١٨٩٠–١٨٩١. et al., showed the previously hidden ability of the clergy in general and religious mentors in particular to influence the internal political situation and led them to establish contact with the masses.

A new period of development of religious mentoring was caused by the Constitutional Revolution in Persia of ١٩٠٥–١٩١١. In the religious society of Iran of this era, no movement could succeed without the support of the clergy. Thus, the interest of a number of theologians to the ideas of the constitutional movement became decisive. At the same time, in trying to explain the new realities through the paradigm of Islam, the clergy divided. Thus, Sheikh Fazlullah Nuri, speaking in favor of a system based on Sharia, openly refused to recognize the parliamentary system, since, in his opinion, it contradicts the basic provisions of Islam. As a result, the first experience of the new constitutional order forced the clergy to abandon their interference in political affairs and engage in the strengthening of religious centers.

During the reign of Shah Reza Pahlavi (١٩٢٥–١٩٤١), religious circles were only engaged in the restoration and development of the spiritual center of Qom, where Ayatollah Haeri Yazdi in ١٩٢٢ founded and headed the seminary. It is noteworthy that Khayeri refused to accept an invitation to come to Najaf and become a religious mentor, noting that it was his duty to remain in Iran. In

spite of this, the competent religious leaders conferred on him the title "Marja Al-Taklid". Among the disciples of the Ayatollahs were Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini (١٩٠٢–١٩٨٩), Mohammad Ali Araki (١٨٩٤–١٩٩٤), Muhammad Reza Golpayegani (١٨٩٨–١٩٩٣), **Muhammad Kazem Shariatmadari (١٩٠٥–١٩٨٦), and** Ahmad Hansari (١٨٩١–١٩٨٤)..

The Institute of Religious Mentorship gradually strengthened its position, taking up more space in all areas of society. The apogee of its development was the ١٩٧٩ Islamic Revolution in Iran, which consolidated the supremacy of the clergy and the main role of religion in political affairs. Having many followers and counting on their support, religious leaders use their position to influence the foreign policy of the state. For example, Ayatollah Seyid Ali Sistani in June ٢٠١٤, after a third of the territory of Iraq was captured by militants of the DAISH group, issued a fatwa calling on Iraqi citizens to defend the country, its people and holy places. Tens of thousands of volunteers who joined the Iraqi forces instantly responded to his call. The fatwa also helped the Shiite, Sunni, Christian, and Yezidi militaries to recognize the leadership of the formations, called militia forces. In total, about ٦٥ thousand volunteers joined the execution of the fatwa, including ١٧ thousand representatives of Sunni tribes.

In November ٢٠١٥, the Ayatollah addressed the young people of Europe and the USA

Sayyid Ali Khamenei. In his view, criminal extremist and terrorist groups, such as Daesh, were the product of a clash with alien cultures. He emphasizes: if the problem was only in religion, such phenomena would have been observed long before the era of colonialism, but history shows opposite examples. "Reliable historical evidence allows us to understand how

the colonial merger of extremism and rejected ideas in the heart of the Bedouin tribe sowed the seeds of extremism in this region. So how

It is possible that such rubbish as DAISH comes from one of the most ethical and humane religious schools, one of whose key ideas is the conviction that killing one person is equivalent to killing all of humanity? "he asks.

A significant component of the manifestation of religious extremism is the destruction of holy places. In this regard, it is worth noting a number of outstanding ulama, sharply condemning such actions in their fatwas. Thus, Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi says that "every act that leads to division and discord among Muslims must be avoided, all Muslims must unite in the face of a common enemy"; he emphasizes: any manifestation of disrespect for the holy shrines of madhhabs is strictly prohibited.Ayatollah

Describing the Sunni-Shiite relationship, Shubeyri Zanjani writes: "Believers, according to the method of the Family of the Prophet, should certainly avoid all those acts that lead to discord and separation of Muslim society, and donkey blyayut Islam. " Ayatollah Sistani argues that "insulting the sanctities of the Sunnis is contrary to the teachings of the Family of the Prophet (SAS)." The great imam of the University of Cairo, Al-Azhar Sheikh Ahmad al-Tayyib, organizes meetings of Shiite and Sunni leaders. So, at the conference on the unity of Muslims around the world, eminent Islamic theologians were invited to condemn the horrific inhuman crimes committed by extremist groups. Later Ahmad al - Tayib called on all participants to the general meeting of the university in order to draw up the text of a joint fatwa against the murder of Muslims. Ayatollah Shirazi, who was invited to the meeting, expressed concern over terrorist acts committed under the banner of Islam and which are of an exclusively extremist nature. He stated that the killing of representatives of other faiths is carried out by terrorist groups, it has nothing to do with Islam and is strongly condemned in the civilized Muslim community.

Ayatollah Sistani's address to the soldiers says: "There are a number of principles of jihad that should be followed by everyone fighting non-Muslims. The Prophet, peace be upon him and his descendants, advised all his companions to follow these rules

before sending them to the battlefields. " The words of Imam Jafar al-Sadiq (٨٣–١٤٨) are also given there: "When the Messenger of God, peace be upon him and his descendants, made the decision to send troops into battle, he sat down with them and advised them to represent God justly and follow the correct example of religion the messenger. He said: "Do not allow yourself to commit extremist acts, do not resort to deception, do not kill the elderly, children and women, and do not cut down trees, except when you are obliged to do so."

According to the famous religious mentor of the great Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Gerami, the only force that was able to prevent extremism was still the power of the word of the clergy and theologians, Khatyb and seminaries; they use various methods in their work, and their followers respect them and turn to them. He notes that in countries far from spiritual centers, there is a more open manifestation of extremism. Unfortunately, many people in Islamic communities do not turn to moral sources and Islamic behavior in its real meaning. Now in most cases there is a problem of hostility, and not the lack of culture.

A religious mentor from Qom, Ayatollah Nuri Hamedani, called radicalism a threat to the Islamic world and called on Muslims to use every opportunity to protect the Islamic faith. At various times, the extremists actions related to Daishev activities condemned and

called wrongful six senior clerics, has the title of "Grand Ayatollah" and "marja al-taqlid": Shawbury Zanjani, Safi Golpayegani, Mousavi Ardebili, Makarem Shirazi, Jafar Sobhani, Youssef Sanei.

Aware of the scale of the spread of extremist religious views, the heads of state seek to establish cooperation to combat this problem, since the solidarity of top leadership, as well as more active promotion of interfaith harmony, can have a tremendous impact on the situation. One example of such interaction was the aforementioned meetings of Shiite and Sunni leaders, during which they condemned the actions of extremists around the world. With the support of religious activists in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, Shiite theologians in Iran are developing close cooperation with Sunni religious figures from Arab states and other countries in the region.

Modern Islamic jurisprudence not only contrasts its conceptual approach with the views of the ideological leaders of the Muslim radicals, but it also extremely accurately qualifies terrorist activities from the standpoint of Sharia. Some authoritative Muslim thinkers are convinced that it is not enough to call modern Muslim terrorists stupid or some group that has gone astray. They are criminals fighting with Allah and His Messenger, and for their atrocities should be held responsible by the Koran. Moreover,

along with the perpetrators of this crime, the responsibility for its commission should be equally borne by its organizers, inspirers and sponsors.

The spread of religious extremism alarming heads of state and spiritual leaders around the world, obliging them to search for effective ways to solve this problem. Globalization processes allow people and communities to speak more openly about their views, which often causes discontent among followers of other religious schools and movements. A significant role in countering extremist sentiments is capable of playing the institution of religious mentoring, which has always adhered to the principle of "calling for the good and banning the reprehensible." Attracting religious mentors to the execution of public duty to combat extremism and terrorism demonstrates positive results, and therefore this practice has been widely used in many countries around the world, including those in which the Muslim population is represented by a numerical minority. The following conclusion can be drawn: the cooperation of spiritual leaders, which implies a joint search for ways to solve the problem of religious extremism, will continue to be maintained and developed because of its effectiveness, which contributes to inculcating true values to the younger generation.

References

١. **Bartoli A., Coleman P.T. Dealing with Extremists // Beyond** Intractability / Eds. G. Burgess, H. Burgess. - Boulder: Conflict Information Consortium, Univ. Colorado, ٢٠٠٣. - URL: http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/dealing-extremists, free.

٢. **Fridinsky S.N. Countering the implementation of extremist** activity // Legality. - ٢٠٠٨. - № ٦. - P. ٢٨–٣١.

٣. **Jibril A.R.M. Islamic Extremism: The Untold Truth. -** South Africa: Partridge, ٢٠١٥. - ٢٠٨ p.

٤. **Kokorev V.G. The concept and signs of religious extremism** // Socio-economic phenomena and processes. - ٢٠١٤. - V. ٩, № ٥. - P. ٨٩–٩٧.

٥. **Hashemian-far S. The typology of the political behavior of** Shiite religious mentors (Guneshenasi-ye rafter-e siyasi-ye marja'a-ye taghlid-e shiye). - Tehran:

Imam Sadeq University, ١٣٩٠. - ٣٣٢ p. (in Persian. lang.)

٦. **Mir I. The Religion and Politics Connection: Magist. dis.** (Rabete-ye din va siyasat). - Tehran: Imam Sadek University, ١٣٧٩. - ٣١٣ **p. (in Persian. lang.)**

٧. **M. Farasthah. At the beginning of modern religious and** non-religious thinking (Dar aghaz-e nou andishe-ye moaser-e dini

va gheyr-e dini). - Tehran: Sherqat-e Sahami-e-Entheshar, ١٣٧٧. - ٥٤٦ p. (in Persian. lang.)

٨. Salami R. Review of the role of the spiritual leaders of the constitutional movement and the Islamic revolution: Magist. dis. (Barrasi-ye naghsh-e rahbaran-e rouhani-ye nehzat-e mashruteh va eghelab-e eslami). - Tehran: Imam Sadek University, ١٣٦٨. - ٢٢٠ p. (in Persian. lang.)

٩. Hosseinian R. The Political History of Shiism (Tarikh-e siyasi-ye tashayo). - Tehran:Markaz-e Asnad-e Enghelab-e Eslami, ١٣٨٠. - ١٢١١ p. (in Persian. lang.)

١٠. Ruhbahshsh R. The legacy of Ayatollah Borujerdi (Miras-e ayatollah Borujerdi). - Tehran: Moaseseye chap va ngshe Oruj, ١٣٨٠. - ٢٩٠ p. (in Persian. lang.)

١١. Analysis of the role of Shiite theologians in the rise of the Islamic revolution
(Takhlili bar naghsh-e aleman-e shiye dar peydayesh-e enghlab-e eslami). - Tehran: Archive of the Islamic Revolution, ١٣٧٩. - ١١٢ p. (in Persian. lang.)

١٢. Haeri A. Shiism and constitutionalism in Iran (Tashayo va masrutiyat dar Iran va naghsh-e iraniyan-e moghim-e Erag). - Tehran: Amir Kabir, ١٣٦٤. - T. ١. - ٤٠٠ p. (in Persian. lang.)

١٣. Razi M.Sh. History and encyclopedia of the seminary in Qum (Tarikh va dayere ol-moaref-e house-ye elmi-ye ghom). - Cum: w / o, ١٣٣٣. - T. ١. - ١٢٢٠ s. (in Persian. lang.)

١٤. Yazdi M.Kh. The memory of Dr. Khaeri Yazdi (Khaterat-e doctor). - Tehran: Ketab-e Nader, ١٣٨١. - ١٤٤ p. (in Persian. lang.)