

نقد نظرية الأشعرين في قدم الصفات الثبوتية الالهية وفقاً لأسس الحكمة المتعالية

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Criticism of the Ash'arites Theory on the Uncreatedness of Positive Attributes of God based on the Foundations of Transcendental Wisdom

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المستخلص

الصفات الإلهية وعلاقتها بذاته هي واحدة من أهم القضايا اللاهية في العالم الإسلامي وأن الآيات القرآنية في هذا الصدد أدت إلى ظهورها بين مفكري المسلمين. في هذه الأثناء، يعتقد الأشعريون أن الصفات الإلهية الثبوتية زائدة على الذات وقديمة ولهم حجج مختلفة في نواح كثيرة لاثبات هذه المدعي: قياس الحاضر مع الغائب، حمل الصفات بعضها على البعض وعلي ذات الإلهي وكون الذات الإلهية قديمة. جميع هذه الحجج تبدو خاطية. لأن عدم صحة أسباب الجزء الأول هو فقدان الجامع المشتركة بين جانبي القياس أعني الكائن القديم والحادث. حمل الصفات بعضها على البعض وعلي ذات الإلهية يحكي عن العينية مصداقا والتفاوت بينهم مصداقا لا القدم والزيادة. إن القدم الذات الإلهية يستلزم ابطال نظرية متكلمي معتزلة في حدوث الصفات الإلهية وليس من الضروري أن تكون قديمة أو زائدة.

الكلمات الرئيسية: الأشعريون، الله، الصفات، القدم، الزيادة.

Abstract

Divine attributes and their relation to essence is one of the most fundamental theological issues in the Islamic world that the Qur'anic verses in this regard have led to its emergence among Muslim thinkers. Meanwhile, the Ash'arites believe that the divine positive attributes are different from essence and uncreated in time, and they have various arguments due to comparing the present with the absent, to carry attributes on each other and on divine essence, and on the uncreated essence of God. These arguments seem to be fallacious. Because the problem of the reasons for the first part is the lack of a comprehensive commonality between the two sides of the comparison, namely the uncreated and created being. The reference of attributes to one another and to the essence also implies the extensional objectivity and their conceptual difference, not the uncreatedness and the differences. The uncreatedness of God also requires the revoke of Mu'tazilite theory on the createdness of attributes, and it has nothing to do with their uncreatedness and differences.

Key words: Ash'arites, God, Attributes, Uncreated in time, Different..

Introduction

Since the revelation of the Holy Qur'an and the introduction of God with many names and attributes, how the divine essence has been associated with traits has been one of the issues mentioned among Islamic thinkers. In the meantime, they have presented different theories about the attributes of God: [1] From Mu'tazilite perspective, attributes of God are created in time (Abdul Jabbar, 1422, pp. 80-81). Because the uncreatedness of attributes require multiplicity of ancient redactors and are incompatible with monotheism. [2] Philosophers, including Mulla Sadra, hold that traits are objectified by the essence of God and that their differences are conceptual (Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 6, p. 132) [3]. Based on the Ash'arites' view, the seven positive attributes namely science, power, life, speech, will, hearing, and seeing are different from the essence and they are uncreated. It means that each of them is conceptually and externally different from the essence of God and therefore they are not the same truth of essence or out of Him (al-Qazālī, 1416, p. 130)¹.

The Ash'arites, while giving general arguments for proving the uncreatedness and the difference of divine attributes, explain the uncreatedness of each attribute and emphasize that proving the uncreatedness of each attribute is related to the uncreatedness of other positive attributes. (Iji, nd, p. 282). For the proof of some of the attributes such as power is related to the proof of other attributes such as science (Iji, nd, p. 289).

The present study examines and criticizes the Ash'arites theory about the uncreatedness and different divine attributes over the essence according to Mulla Sadra's foundations in transcendental wisdom.

The Ash'arites' arguments for proving the uncreatedness of the positive attributes

Ash'aritheologians put forward numerous arguments to prove that the seven positive attributes are uncreated in time. In the following sections, they will be reviewed and criticized according to Mulla Sadra's foundations in transcendental wisdom, respectively.

Comparing the present with the absent

One of the reasons of the Ash'ari theologians for proving the uncreatedness and the difference of the positive attributes is the deductive argument between the present being and the absent being

which is examined and criticized in this section on the basis of Sadrian principles.

[1] When comparing the present person with the absent person, there is no difference in their relation to positive traits such as science. Because the criterion of being positive and attachment to traits is not different between them. Explaining that the reason for naming the present person as a scientist is the attribute of science. Defining the attribute of science and its attribute to a foreign person makes no difference between being present and being absent. Because the criterion for attaching to the attributes is the same about them. Consequently, due to having positive traits in some present persons, its positive state can also be deduced about absent individuals and creatures (Jurjāni, 1325, vol. 8, p. 45). So, when we see in humans that being scientist means having a different trait named science or being powerful means to have a trait named power, so it will be the same about the absent being, namely God, and His attributes are not the same as essence and they are uncreated in time (Taftazani, 1409, vol. 4, p. 73).

It is important to note that this argument is about common traits such as science and life. Because it requires a common comprehensive deductive argument. But this is not the same for other traits such as being created in time (Taftazani, 1409, vol. 4, p. 72). Because God is uncreated and not created. Therefore, such attributes of the created creatures cannot be transmitted to the created God.

Criticism: The most important problem of this argument is the lack of a comprehensive commonality between man and God in relation to the positive attributes. Because God is abstract and due to lack of materiality or lack of absence and talent, His attributes are not acquisitive. On the contrary, man acquires his attributes because of his materiality, and prior to attachment to them, he has had an absent state to perfectionistic traits. For this reason, Mulla Sadra states that according to the necessity of existence (Mulla Sadra, 1981, vol. 6, p. 52), His essence possesses all the perfectionistic traits without the need for a cause (Mulla Sadra, 1360, p. 38). In principle, the criterion of attachment to the perfectionist traits in Mulla Sadra's view is that it does not lead to defect or failure (Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 1, p. 379). In this regard, Mulla Sadra states that traits are existential perfectionism, but because of the suspicion in the attribution to them, they are different from the other in each being

(Mulla Sadra, 1360, p. 7). Consequently, the attribution of man to the positive attributes cannot be regarded as Necessity Existence and make a comparison. Because man has a weak existence but God has an infinite intensity of existence.

Regardless of this drawback, this argument proves that God is attributed to the positive traits and He is different from essence. But it does not prove them to be uncreated in time. Because the analogy is that man is created in time, not uncreated in time.

[2] When a capable person performs an act, it is forbidden to create and do the same because of the impossibility of attaining the result. Therefore, the attribute of power does not belong to the performed act again. But when the scientist performs something with his science [= the attachment of the science of the scientist to the performance of an action] then he is also aware of the act. In this respect, each of the two attributes of power and will differ from one another in relation to humans (Rāzī, 1407, vol. 3, p. 226). Because of the same criterion for attributing to attributes regarding the present and absent, this results in the uncreatedness and difference of positive attributes.

Criticism: This argument also lacks a common comprehensive. Because human beings, due to their potentiality and materiality, have different components and traits. In other words, man is composed of existence and essence because of the inherent possibility on the one hand, and compound of matter and appearance because of the possibility of talent on the other hand. Therefore, each of his attributes is different from the other, and their belonging to different acts may not be the same. But God is not compound and no compound has a way in him. In other words, He is "Simple Truth²" (Mulla Sadra, 1420, p. 93), which in His nature has all the positive and perfect attributes. Of course, in such a way that plurality or composition is not necessary in His essence. Because the necessity of multiplicity and composition is the existence of multiplicity in attributes. While the Necessary Being is not incomplete and because he is a simple truth, it possesses all of the perfectionistic traits in its essence. As a result, his traits are not different from the essence [or createdness in time] (Mulla Sadra, 1360, p. 138) and the connection to the attributes concerning a Necessary Being cannot be compared to a material and compound being as a human being.

[3] If the attributes of God are created in timelike science, they will be created in time like other objects and beings. For the truth of the

attributes about the present creatures is not different from the absent ones. That is, the present created creatures have the attributes created in time. Because the adjective is a function of noun in contingency. Thus, in the event of the createdness, divine inherent attributes are like other beings, in possibility or contingency. Whereas the divine essence is uncreated in time and is not created in time (Amadi, 1423, vol. 1, p. 338).

Critique: This reason proves that divine attributes are not created in time and are uncreated in time. But the other claim of Ash'arites does not prove the difference of the attributes over the essence. For it can be said that the divine attributes are uncreated in time due to lack of pre-eternity of essence, although they are the same as divine essence, and their difference is conceptual, not extensional. For the dignity of the essence of Necessary Existence is to have all the attributes of perfection (Mulla Sadra, 1354, p. 132).

It is worth noting that this argument is inconsistent with the first two arguments. Because the third argument holds that traits are pre-eternity in present beings but they must be uncreated in time in old beings. But the first and second arguments state that the truth of the attributes is the same for all beings, and that there is no difference between the pre-eternity and the creation in time in the criterion of attachment to them. Hence in this part the Ash'arites' arguments are entangled with some kind of inner contradiction.

Attributing some traits to one another and divine essence

There is no doubt that in many Qur'anic theories, God is known as having many attributes that theologians prove them rationally in their theological arguments. It is part of the Ash'arites' arguments to prove the uncreatedness and difference of divine attributes through such theorems.

[1] If the attributes of God are one and the same as divine essence, then carrying the attributes on essence will be meaningless. Because then things like "being aware, being able, being alive and ... God" would be like carrying the very essence of the thing on itself. While this is not true. Therefore, each of God's attributes as well as His essence have a different truth and are not the same. As a result, each of these traits are different from the other and the essence of God and they are uncreated in time (Jurjāni, 1325, vol. 8, p. 46).

The Ash'arites also provide another interpretation of this argument: If the divine attributes are the same as the other and thus the same as the

essence of God, the concept of each will be the same as the other and the same as the divine essence. While each attribute and essence has a meaning different from the other (Jurjāni, 1325, vol. 8, pp. 46-47). In other words, the meaning of each of the traits, such as being wise and being capable is different from the other. Because the capable person may not be wise, or the wise person may not be capable. As a result, the truth of wise is different from the truth of capable (Rāzī, 1407, vol. 3, p. 226).

Critique: for theorizing between the two, it is not necessary to realize the difference between them. In cases like "Man is a talking animal" the difference between the subject and the predicate is conceptual, not extensional. In this sense, in some cases, the subject and predicate have the same existential truth from which multiple concepts are abstracted and conveyed to one another. Given this point, according to Mulla Sadra, the distinction between divine attributes with each other and with the essence of God is purely conceptual, not existential. Because God is so powerful that many names and attributes are abstracted from His essence and attributed to each other and because of His simplicity and lack of composition, the transfer of attributes to one another or to the essence does not require a multiplicity of directions and dignities (Mulla Sadra, 1302, p. 187). Because not being simple requires composition and possibility because of the need for components. As a result it cannot be deduced from theorizing between the uncreated divine attributes and the attributes different from the essence.

Given this, it is not possible to assume a trait in God and lack of another trait in God. Because God has the all existential perfection because of His simplicity and true unity. Therefore, the assumption of the existence of a trait and the absence of another trait in Him requires a combination and the possibility of Necessary Existence (Mulla Sadra, 1366, Vol. 4, p. 56). Given this, differences of traits with each other such as the realization of science without the will or the realization of will without science are possible only in composite beings such as man, not in the simple existence and the true unit.

[2] The scientist is a person who possesses the attribute of science and the known thing has some form of belonging to science. Because the science of the scientist belongs to it. Thus the wisdom of God (in terms such as "God is wise") means having knowledge and science (Taftazani, 1409, vol. 4, p. 72), each of which is different from the other. As a result, the trait of science is different from the divine essence and uncreated in

time. Because having a relation and an overlap between the two sides and thus the theorizing shows their difference (Rāzī, 1407, vol. 3, p. 226). Such a relation is not negative (Rāzī, 1986, p. 1, p. 220) but it is positive. Because it tells of a special relationship between the two sides, not its denial. As a result, the positive traits are different from essence and they are uncreated in time.

Criticism: From Mulla Sadra's viewpoint, the two sides resemble each other; so if one of them is actual, the other will be actual and if one is potential, the other will be potential too. Given this, the existential truth of God is known because of the abstractness of the qualifications, and the certainty is the very truth of His existence. Now that this is the case with the rule of "two equivalents are equal in existence", by proving that God is known, His science is also proven, and the difference between the knowing and the known is conceptual not existential or different (Mulla Sadra, 1420, pp. 72-73). Therefore, the correlation between the knowing and the known does not require that the attribute of science be uncreated in time and different from the divine essence. Because the conceptual difference also suffices for the truth of the correlation.

[3] The opposite of the theory "God is Aware" is the theory "God is not Aware" and so its opposite is not "God is not capable." If God's attributes are the same as His essence, the incapability of God will contradict His Science. Therefore, each of the attributes of God is different from His essence, so they are uncreated in time and different from His essence (Rāzī, 1407, vol. 3, p. 225). In other words, "Surely the Essence of God exists" is meaningless, but the theory "Surely the essence of God, the Almighty the All-Aware, exists" gives a certain meaning. This proves that divine existence and essence are different from His attributes (Rāzī, 1407, vol. 3, pp. 225-226).

Criticism: The lack of paradox in "God is the All-Aware" with the theory "God is not capable" is due the plurality in their concept. The explanation is that the contradiction in the theorems means the positivity of a theorem and the negativity of the same (Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 2, p. 105) like the contradiction of the "God is All-Aware" with the saying "God is not All-Aware". Therefore, the lack of contradiction of the two theorems argued in this argument is due to the difference of the predicate. The other point is that the difference between the All-Aware and the Almighty is conceptual about God, not exemplar. The Necessary

Existence has all divine attributes and perfections as well as unification and simplification. For any multiplicity in His essence leads to compounding and possibility (Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 8, p. 121).

[4] If the wisdom of God is as His capability, every known must be possible too.

Therefore, the Necessary Inherent Being and the Impossible Inherent Being can be also possible for human. For they are regarded known for human, and he is aware of them. While such things do not belong to human power. As a result, the power of God is different from His wisdom (Rāzī, 1407, vol. 3, p. 226). Because God is aware of the impossibilities, but His power does not belong to create them.

Critique: According to the principles of Mulla Sadra in the discussion of attributes, one must distinguish between the two types of inherent and actual attributes (Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 6, p. 352). The inherent attributes are inherent and are realized with it. Therefore, the inherent attributes are not different from those of essence regarding the objectivity. Because the simple existence has all the attributes and perfections. In contrast, the emergence of inherent attributes are regarded as actual attributes in the level of creation and creatures that God creates the creatures with His knowledge and power. But belonging the attributes of God to beings is not the same. For example, the inclusion of science is greater than power or seeing and hearing, which indicates the difference between the actual attributes and belonging to the beings, not the inherent attributes. According to this point, the fallacy in this argument is the contagion of the actual traits to inherent traits. Therefore, it cannot be deduced from the inclusion difference of the actual traits that the inherent traits are uncreated in time.

God's connection to the positive attributes is a perfection

God also has all the perfections of all beings because He is the Creator of all beings. In other words, the Necessary Being has all the attributes of perfection [= absolute perfection] and imparts them to the creatures. The Ash'arites make use of this issue to argue that the divine attributes are uncreated in time and different. It is noteworthy that the basis of Mulla Sadra's arguments for proving the objectivity of divine attributes with essence is also derived from this premise³. Here is a description and critique of the Ash'arites' arguments with regard to Sadrian principles:

[1] There is no doubt that attachment to the positive attributes indicates perfection of noun, such as being wise or powerful that indicates the qualification of two attributes of wisdom and power about a particular person. Equally, the attachment of God to the positive attributes also proves the inherent perfection of God, which is the lack of attachment resulted from deficiency and lack of perfection. Therefore, God has all the attributes of perfection in eternity, and because of their greatness and age, God does not need a cause to connect with them (Jurjāni, 1325, vol. 8, p. 48).

Criticism: The premises of this argument state that God possesses all the attributes of perfection, and that the Ash'arites conclude by using this material that the attributes are ancient and abundant. But this result includes preliminaries. Because the qualification of perfection traits may be objectively like essence as Mulla Sadra claims (Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 6, p. 133). The other point is that proving the oldness of traits regarding the absolute terms is incompatible with the claim of other Ash'arites in this regard, namely, the difference. Because in the case of difference, the attributes are not the same as the being and are different. As a result, the essence of the being does not have all of the perfection attributes:

«لو كانت زائدة على وجود ذاته لم يكن ذاته في مرتبة وجود ذاته مصداقا لصدق هذه الصفات الكمالية فيكون

(Mulla Sadra, 1981, v. 6, p. 133) ذاته بنفس ذاته عارية عن معاني هذه

النعوت

Thus, in the case of difference in attributes, the essence of God also lacks perfection attributes.

[2] Unless divine attributes are the same as uncreated science, they are not out of two essential or theoretical states. Because science is divided into two essential or theoretical parts. The essentiality of divine attributes results in the frustrated agent of God and lack of the attribute of will or power. Theoretical science having been ignored due to being acquired.

Because the knowing lacks it and seeks to acquire it. While ignorance is impossible for God. The other point is that theoretical sciences end in essential sciences. For if any imagination or affirmation leads to another and does not end in the obvious sciences, it will lead to sequence. But it

was stated that the realization of the inherent sciences is impossible about God and this is impossible due to being a forcible agent and lack of will trait (Amadi, 1423, vol. 1, pp. 336-337).

Criticism: It is a common rhetorical necessity that it is sometimes referred to as forcible agent, which means the necessity of issuing the act from such agents without authority and will. The forcible agent chooses not to do or leave an act because of the lack of control over the act, and the act is always issued from him, such as the fire which is the agent of heat in the view of Ash'arites. But sometimes it is regarded inherent in science which is opposed to theoretical. What is inherent in this kind of evident sciences means that there is no need for acquisition, such as the obvious refusal of society and the height of the contradictory. These two inherent types have no relation to each other. For it is possible for an agent with the actual evident knowledge to do or to leave it, such as the righteousness and the taboo of cruelty are evident. Therefore, this argument of the Ash'arites entails the fallacy of the literal sharing between the two meanings of necessity. For it is concluded from the inherent versus the theoretical, that the acts are forcible.

Furthermore, according to Mulla Sadra's principles, the forcible agent has knowledge and will but due to external force, he does not perform a specific act by his own will (Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 2, p. 223) such as a man forced to go to prison. In contrast, the agent, whose actions are necessarily done without will and knowledge, is a natural agent not an imposed one (Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 2, p. 220), as in the case of the Ash'arites' example for fire. The main difference between these two types of subject is also in the forcible science and its lack on the natural subject. As a result, the confusion between forcible and natural agents is another fallacy of this argument of Ash'ari theologians.

[3] If divine attributes are created in time, they will be either a perfection attribute or a defect attribute. In the first one, God will require the created attributes in His perfection traits. The attachment of God to the defective attributes is also impossible (Amadi, 1423, vol. 1, p. 338). Because it is incompatible with His innate perfection. Consequently, in view of the nullity of the divine traits contingency, it is proved that their essence are uncreated in time and different.

Critique: This argument proves that divine attributes are not created in time. But this does not require that the attributes of God should be uncreated in time and be different from the essence. Because the

uncreatedness of attributes is also compatible with the objectivity [according to Mulla Sadra's principles]. As a result, this argument is incompatible with the outcome. Mulla Sadra, therefore, believes that the creation of such traits, like their difference, necessitates another cause in connection with the perfection traits and therefore the Necessary Existence is incomplete and possible (Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 6, p. 134).

[4] If divine attributes are created in time like the science, that is, when God does not have them in eternity, he is not out of the presumption of unity or plurality. The first state i.e. the unity of divine attributes is not true. For the divine attributes belong to all its attributes, such as the attribute of science or power to all beings. In this sense, one attribute will be multiplied when it is unified. The assumption that the divine attributes are multiplied also results in the plurality and multiplicity in his essence, which contradicts the unity of God (Amadi, 1423, vol. 1, p. 338).

Criticism: This argument, like the previous reason, refutes the creation of traits, which stated that it does not require proving the uncreatedness and the difference between the traits and the essence. Hence this argument also entails incompatibility and generality of preliminaries toward the result.

[5] In the case of the createdness of divine attributes such as science, God will know His own knowledge. Because otherwise He needs to be ignorant. But the knowledge of God in relation to His science is not out of three assumptions: If the essence of God has such a science, the attribute of science will be uncreated in time because of the absence of contingency in nature. If in this assumption the knowledge of God depends on another created science, there will be sequence (Amadi, 1423, vol. 1, p. 339). Consequently, because of the nullity of succession, the trait of science is uncreated in time and different from essence.

Criticism: The Ash'arites should mean by the introduction, "If divine attributes such as science are created in time, God will know His own knowledge" that the assumption is the creation of science. Because if the trait of science is uncreated in time, then this assumption or problem will occur. Thus it is argued that God's attributes are not created in time because of the arguments expressed in the reasoning. However, as mentioned, such an argument was capable of proving the Ash'arites claim on the uncreatedness and lack of the difference of attributes from the

essence. Because, if there is a difference, the divine essence lacks some attributes such as science.

The oldness of God's essence

Another argument of the Ash'ari theologians in proving that the attributes of God are uncreated in time is through non-createdness and therefore the uncreatedness of His essence, which is examined critically in this section. It is noteworthy that the most important arguments of Ash'arites in this case that proves the uncreatedness of positive attributes. The critique of their arguments in this section are as follows:

[1] The divine essence is uncreated in time and other beings are created in time. Hence the divine essence and nature are different from the essence of the beings created in time (Iji, nd, p. 290). On the other hand, the attribute has relation with the agent and the uncreatedness of the essence necessitates the non-createdness of the attributes and the createdness of the essence implies that the attributes are not uncreated in time (Jurjāni, 1325, vol. 8, p. 79). As a result, because of the uncreatedness of divine essence, His attributes are not created in time and are different from the essence.

Criticism: According to this argument, the divine attributes are not created in time due to the inclusion of attribute with the being. But this does not mean that the divine attributes are different from the essence. Thus, such an argument does not prove the second claim of the Ash'arites, that is, the difference of attributes from essence. Moreover, it has been stated in the preceding sections that the non-createdness of traits does not have inclusion with their uncreatedness. For this reason, in Mulla Sadra's view, divine attributes are not created in time. However, they have an objectivity with the essence of God and their difference is conceptual.

[2] The Ash'arites, using the createdness of the universe try to prove the attribute of will for God and His voluntary subject. Because the attribute of the will assigns the universe to a particular time and the universe is created in it. Since the essence of God, due to the ratio of equality to all creatures, does not belong to any one of its own time, but the attribute of the will is the cause (Amadi, 1423, vol. 1, pp. 280-281). If God lacks the attribute of will, His actions will be forcible. Because He will not have the ability to either choose it or leave it. As a result, the created beings will always be with the Divine essence. In other words, the created becomes uncreated. If the existence of the

created one requires the condition of another createdness without the the uncreated attribute of will, there will be sequence. While this is not true (Jurjāni, 1325, vol. 8, p. 51) and because of the nullity of the uncreated divine will sequence, the world is built at a particular time.

In other words, if the attributes of God were created in time, the infinite created beings would have raised upon the divine essence. Because the creature needs the creator. In this respect, the issuance of a being created by God becomes conditional upon the existence of another created being and the sequence is necessary.

As a result, because of the nullity of the succession, divine attributes especially the will are uncreated in time and not created in time (Jurjāni, 1325, vol. 8, p. 51). For this reason, the uncreated God has uncreated attributes, including will, and, by His will, creates the universe at a particular time without the need for a reference. The Ash'arites give two examples in explaining the needlessness of divine acts: Choosing one of two paths by a human who is escaping from the wild animal, and when a very thirsty man drinks from one of the two water bowls without the need for an external preference (Jurjāni, 1325, vol. 8, P. 54).

Criticism: This argument proves that the divine attributes are not created in time like the previous ones and is therefore silent toward the uncreatedness and their difference. Second, one of the basic premises of this argument is the temporal creation of the universe. While this is not true according to Mulla Sadra. Because the assumption of time before the creation of the universe, in which no being exists, is contradictory. Because time itself is a possible thing and not a temporal createdness. Therefore, one of the beings created in time is assumed uncreated in Ash'ari theory. Also, time is the amount of motion, so it is assumed that time is associated with the existence of a moving object (Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 3, pp. 160-161). However, the Ash'arites want to consider the time free of any created beings. It is therefore not possible to prove the uncreatedness of divine attributes, including the will, by using the temporal createdness of universe.

Another drawback to this argument is the non-referenced preference. In Mulla Sadra's view, all beings have also extremity, including natural and unconscious agents. However, in some cases one may not have knowledge of their ends (Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 1, p. 209). For this reason, God also has some extremities in His actions by which He performs His actions.

The third drawback of this argument seems to be the appeal to creatures and their creation in time in proving divine attributes, including the will. Basically, the attributes of the divine essence must be proven in a way that does not require creatures. If the proof of the divine attributes depends on the creatures, there will be a need for creatures and possibilities. With this in mind, by using the simple truth and his comprehensiveness towards all existential perfections, he proves the divine attributes (Mulla Sadra, 1363, p. 49) without having to prove the attributes with regard to the creatures.

[3] According to many Qur'anic verses, God has various attributes that are different from nature:

(He has sent it down with His knowledge) (An-Nisā' : 166)

(It has been sent down with God's knowledge) (Hūd: 14)

(The Possessor of Strength, the Ever Sure) (Dhāriyāt: 58)

(That the power altogether belongs to God) (Baqarah: 165)

(Taftazani, 1409, vol. 4, p. 72).

Therefore, in the view of Ash'arites, the Qur'an explicitly refutes the Mu'tazilite theory on the denial of attributes. As a result, God has positive attributes that, because of the uncreatedness of the essence, His attributes are also uncreated and different from the essence (Taftazani, 1409, vol. 4, p. 77).

Criticism: These verses state that God has many attributes, but does not imply their creation in time [= Mu'tazilite theory] or their uncreatedness [= Ash'ari theory]. On the other hand, some of the Qur'anic verses explicitly state that God, in His essence, possesses all the perfectionistic attributes, such as:

(He is God, the Creator, the Maker, the Shaper to Him belong the Names Most Beautiful) (Hashr: 24)

(He is the All hearing, the All seeing) (Isrā' : 1) (Mulla Sadra, 1360, p. 23).

[4] In the event of createdness of divine attributes, as the Mu'tazilite believe, God would not be absolute perfection, and the assumption of a creature with more perfection attributes would not be impossible because:

(And The Knowledge of the Absolute Knower Is above the knowledge of all men of Knowledge.) (Yūsuf: 76) (Amadi, 1423, vol. 1, p. 339).

While God is the Absolute Perfection, and He also has all possible perfections.

Criticism: The absolute perfection of God, as it means to deny the creation of attributes, negates their difference too. Because, in the assumption of attributes difference, God does not possess all the attributes of perfection in His essence, and is lacks them. Because the attribute is assumed different from the being. Therefore, this argument also rejects the Ash'arites theory about the difference of traits from essence and its conduit is not specific to the Mu'tazilite theory. Consequently, if the divine attributes are different from the essence or be created in time, their effect and possibility are necessary. While the Necessary Existence, is not a Possible Existence (Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 6, p. 134).

[5] Philosophers and theologians, using a number of reasons, prove that the universe has a primordial and eternal cause. Then the question arises whether the creator of the universe has attributes such as science, power, will, etc.? For this reason, each of the thinkers in their own way seeks to prove the divine attributes and provide proofs in this regard and prove each attribute. This shows that the divine essence differs from each of His attributes and each of the attributes are different from the others (Rāzī, 1407, vol. 3, p. 225). For this reason, traits are not created in time because of the uncreatedness of the essence, and the need to provide proof on each of them indicates the difference from the essence.

Criticism: According to the view of Mulla Sadra, the proof of Necessary Existence requires proving all His perfectionistic attributes as well⁴. For the assumption of an absolute perfection and being also means having all the attributes of perfection, and if it lacks an attribute or perfection, it will have a possible state and a lack toward it, which means that the Necessary Existence would be possible. Therefore, the proof of the Necessary Existence requires that he would be capable of all the attributes, although he will prove each of the attributes in detail, explain them, and criticize the other theories about each of the attributes. But such proofs are based on the principle of truth which uses it to prove various attributes including science (Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 6, pp. 154-155).

Despite the criticisms raised, the common drawback of all the Ash'arites arguments in this passage is the presumption of temporal createdness of God. Given that God is abstract from matter and

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that abstract being is not attributed to time, God and His attributes are generally out of time sequence. In other words, we can talk about the creature as a creation or non-creation in time that is temporal. But God, because of non-materiality, is not considered so (Mirdamad, 1367, p. 18).

Conclusion

The truth of divine attributes and the relation of essence to them is one of the most important theological issues in the Islamic world which has been the source of much controversy among Muslim thinkers. The Ash'arites believe that the seven positive attributes are different from the essence and uncreated in time. They put forward various arguments in proving this claim. Most of these arguments revoke the Mu'tazilite theory on the createdness of divine attributes, but they fail to prove the Ash'arites' intended results, namely the uncreatedness and the difference of attributes from essence or the other. In particular, the most important arguments of Ash'arites are that the divine essence is uncreated in time. While the uncreatedness of the essence requires that the traits would not be created in time, but it does not prove that the traits are uncreated in time and different. Because the non-creation of attributes is also consistent with the essence regarding the theory of objectivity.

Basically, the current fallacy on the Ash'arites' arguments is the assumption that God is uncreated temporally. However, God is not attributed to createdness in time or temporal uncreatedness because of non-materiality.

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¹ The Ash'arites believe that the theory of divine attributes oldness does not lead to disbelief and the multiplication of old beings. Since the true ancient is a being and the other ancients are His attributes, so they are not needless and independent of divine essence until it is incompatible with Qur'anic monotheism (Jurjani, 1325, vol. 8, p. 48).

2 Basit al-Haqiqah

3 Mulla Sadra says:

«أن وجوده تعالى حقيقة الوجود فيكون كل الوجود وكله الوجود فكذلك جميع صفاته الكمالية من ذاته فعلمه حقيقة العلم، وقدرته حقيقة القدرة. وما هذا شأنه يستحيل فيه التعدد؛ فعلمه علم بكل شيء، وقدرته قدرة على كل شيء، وإرادته إرادة بكل شيء»

⁴ Mulla Sadra says:

«... فإذا كل واحد من الوجود وكمالات الوجود وكمالات الموجود بما هو موجود يجب أن ينتهي إلى ما هو وجود قائم بذاته علم قائم بذاته قدرة قائمة بذاتها وإرادة قائمة بذاتها و حياة قائمة بذاتها وهكذا في جميع صفاته الكمالية.»

(Mulla Sadra, 1981, v. 6, p. 134)