

The Pragmatic Nature of Manipulation

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Abstract

Broadly defined, manipulation is a kind of covert behavior or a means, whether linguistic or non- linguistic, used by manipulators in certain communicative encounters to achieve their goals, desires, and interests regardless of the perceptual, cognitive , and emotional feelings of their interlocutors. In this regard, they utilize myriad devices, especially those dishonest ones, like cunning, lying, making tricks, deceiving, and the like. To be successful in doing so, manipulators should have a cognition which enables them to pursue their own interests through making use of some aspects of human cognition, notably reasoning, checking for likeliness, and emotions. As such, manipulators play on their targets' weaknesses to influence their motivation, beliefs, emotions, and reaction. For some scholars, manipulation is a psychological issue because it can be considered as a kind of human behavior or cognition. For others, it falls within the region of cognitive pragmatics since it is basically based on the use of cognition in relation to context. In this study, as far as language use is concerned, it is argued that manipulation is more pragmatic than psychological in nature. Besides, it is characterized by pragmatic features other than the cognitive ones. Hence, it is felt, here, that there is a need to reveal those pragmatic aspects to locate its treatment in its right place. This is done by means of identifying the relationship between manipulation and various pragmatic theories and issues.

ملخص البحث

التلاعب بمعناه الواسع يشير الى نوع من السلوك المبطن او وسيلة لغوية أو غير لغوية يلجأ اليه أو اليها المتلاعبون في مواجهات تواصلية لبلوغ اهدافهم ورغباتهم ومصالحهم بغض النظر عن المشاعر العاطفية والذهنية والادراكية لمن يخاطبونهم. وهم بهذا النطاق يستخدمون تنوعا من الوسائل وخاصة غير

النزيهة منها مثل المكر والكذب والتحايل والخداع وما شابه. ولكي ينجحوا في ذلك فعلى المتلاعبين ان يمتلكوا ذهنية تمكنهم من ملاحقة تحقيق مصالحهم الخاصة من خلال الانتفاع من بعض مظاهر الذهنية البشرية وبشكل ملحوظ من اعطاء الحجج والتحقق من الارجحية ومن العواطف. وعلى هذا المنوال يلعب المتلاعبون على نقاط ضعف اهدافهم للتأثير على دوافعهم واراتهم وعواطفهم وردود افعالهم. أما أكاديميا فان التلاعب لبعض المتخصصين مسألة نفسية كونه نوعا من الذهنية البشرية او السلوك البشري. وأما للبعض الاخر فان التلاعب يقع ضمن نطاق التداولية العقلية لأنه بصورة اساسية يستند على استعمال الذهن حسب علاقته بالسياق. وأما للدراسة الحالية وقدر تعلق الأمر باستعمال اللغة فالتلاعب قضية تداولية اكثر منها نفسية. إضافة الى ما تؤمن به هذه الدراسة من ان التلاعب يتصف بصفات تداولية اخرى فضلا عن الخصائص التداولية الذهنية. ومن هنا يأتي الشعور بالحاجة الى كشف هذه الخصائص لوضع التعامل مع التلاعب في مكانه الصحيح وهذا يتحقق من خلال تحديد العلاقة بين التلاعب والقضايا والنظريات التداولية العديدة والمتنوعة .

1. Introduction

People are conceived as complicated human beings, exhibiting an extremely wide range of behaviors that result from an equally wide variety of causes. One of these behaviors is their appeal to manipulation. What drives them to such a kind of behavior is their desire to achieve certain goals regardless of what kind of means they make use of in this regard. In other words, they utilize myriad means which are available at their disposal to influence the behavior of others by stimulating their (other's) perceptual, cognitive, and emotional feelings. For many scholars(cf. for example Braiker2004 and Maillat and Oswald 2009), manipulation is believed to be a psychological issue. However, it is also believed that it should be pragmatically approached; yet, this view limits itself to 'cognitive pragmatics' (cf., for example de saussure2005). This means that other pragmatic issues which do not fall in the region of 'cognitive pragmatic' are not taken into consideration. Hence, it is felt that there is a need to reveal as many of the pragmatic aspects of manipulation as possible to locate its treatment in its right place. In this study, as far as language use is concerned, it is believed that manipulation is more pragmatic than psychological in nature. Hence it sets

itself the task to reveal this particular nature of it. Nevertheless, a background idea about the notion itself is felt to be necessary before embarking on revealing its pragmatic nature. This latter task, i.e. revealing the pragmatic nature of manipulation, is done by studying it through its relation to various pragmatic theories and notions in order to shed light on the pragmatic mechanism which manipulators recourse to when they intend to manipulate others.

2.Manipulation: An Overview

Goodin (1980:59) has first defined the term manipulation as “a deceptive and covert influence adopted by a speaker (a manipulator) to intentionally and directly affect someone’s beliefs, desires, and/or emotions in ways typically not in his self-interest or, at least, not in his self-interest in the present context.” Consequently, the manipulator’s beliefs, desires, and emotions dominate.

Like Goodin, Ware (1981: 149) defines manipulation as a kind of covert influence of the speaker on the manipulated person who has no knowledge of, or does not understand, the ways by which the manipulator affects his choices (ibid). Viewing manipulation as such makes it possible for many scholars to see the whole process as a pragmatic one that achieves its goals without evident detection of the communicative covert intention. In such manipulative situations, as Tarasov (1990: 26) asserts, the speaker wittingly chooses a form of utterance which lacks direct clues of his intentional situation. This can be recognized when the hearer cannot grasp the hidden intentions of the speaker behind what is actually being said. Hence, the use of manipulation in this way breaches Grice’s (1975, 1989) ‘quality’ maxim since the manipulator behaves insincerely to influence his interlocutor without letting the latter notice that.

Rather than covert influence, some theorists analyze manipulation as a kind of defective persuasion. Mills (1995), for instance, specifies that what is distinctive about manipulation is that it purports to be legitimate persuasion that offers good reasons, but in fact, bad reasons are offered (ibid: 111). In a later work, Blass (2006) defines manipulation as a kind of deception, and that it is an attempt to influence the target in such a way that his behaviour or action is used as a tool to achieve the manipulator’s goals. The latter, in his turn, acts, unforced, in such a way that the hearer (his target) does not discern the former’s actions (ibid: 187). In fact, this view of Blass (ibid) is a combination of those of Goodin (1980) and

Trasov (1990) since it includes expressions such as those of ‘deception’ and ‘influence the target’.

As such, manipulation is definitely a form of deception due to its covert nature. In language use, Blass (ibid) confirms that “it is quite acceptable to say: “Can I persuade you to?” But it is very odd to say “Can I manipulate you to ? ” This makes the hidden nature of manipulation obvious. (ibid: 188). At most, Blass’s definition of manipulation is based on McCornack’s (1992) earlier work of “Information Manipulation Theory” (henceforth, IMT). This theory was first developed as an extension of Grice’s (1975, 1989) work of ‘conversational implicature’. According to this theory, Jacobs (1994: 22) suggests that in order to persuade or deceive, the manipulator intentionally breaks out/flouts one (or more) of the conversational maxims. (ibid)

As such, this theory brings to the forefront the idea that manipulation has two forms: deception and persuasion. McCornack's (1992) work takes Grice's theory to a new level and extends it to deceptive communication. He (ibid: 223) states that "manipulative messages are deceptive in that while they constitute deviations from the principles underlying conversational understanding, they remain covert deviations". The person who is being manipulated does not know that the information is being manipulated. Thus, IMT, based on Grice’s theory of implicature, proposes that deception involves the manipulation of information so as to generate false implicatures (Jacobs, 1994: 200). It argues that “in ordinary conversations, individuals monitor the information that they divulge along four various primary dimensions: amount, veracity, relevance, and clarity" (ibid: 19). Sahlman& Canary (1996: 18) here, make a positive contribution to the theory by pointing out that IMT requires that the violation must be unrecognizable by the hearer and that is quite enough for one maxim to be violated in order to be considered as deceptive.

In fact, various attempts by many scholars to expound the notion of manipulation within a linguistic framework can be recognized. Danler (2005: 63), for instance, states that language use is subjective and that everything, including manipulation, can be linguistically expressed. For this reason manipulation, in his view, is at least to a certain degree, inherent in ‘language in use’(ibid). Another clarification for the notion of manipulation is given by de Saussure (2005) who points out that literally, to manipulate, is to use one’s hands to make an object as an instrument

to fulfill things and actions (to operate or control by skilled use of the hands), and sometimes to change the object's original shape. Accordingly, to manipulate a human being means using him/her, i.e. having him/her adopt specific behaviors, to fulfill the needs and interests of the manipulator, regardless of the ones of the manipulated (ibid). But an individual, he (ibid: 12) adds, contrarily to an object, has a cognition that enables him to pursue his own interests; therefore, a manipulator first of all manipulates some aspects of human cognition, notably reasoning, checking for likeliness, emotions, etc. (ibid).

In this regard, two views are introduced by de Saussure (2005: 136) in relation to manipulative discourse. First, manipulative discourse can be a type of discourse, therefore, identifiable through formal features. Second, manipulative discourse can be a type of language use (ibid). Actually, his (ibid: 137) justification for the former view is that if manipulative discourse is a discourse type, like narration, theatre play or fairy tale, then either some linguistic forms can be found only in manipulative discourses, or manipulative discourses are sustained by a unique type of structure, for example, specific argumentative structures. In both cases, these particularities would provide a formal ground for manipulative discourse identification (ibid).

Moreover, Van Dijk (2006a: 360) clarifies that manipulation is a communicative and interactional practice, in which a manipulator exercises control over the audience, usually against their will or against their best interests. This may justify why in daily usage, the concept of manipulation has negative associations – manipulation is bad – because such a practice violates social norms (ibid). This leads Lillian (2008: 14) to argue that receivers of manipulative utterances would be “unconscious of the linguistic structures affecting their perceptions than are speaker/hearers of any other forms of discourse.”

On the basis of the views mentioned above, recent attempts are made to deal with manipulation as a linguistic act with a great creative potential (cf. Asya, 2013: 1). She (ibid: 2) defines manipulation as “any verbal interaction regarded from the point of view of its motivation and realized by the subject (speaker) and the object (listener) of communication.” In this sense, manipulation may include such key elements as “negative” intention of the speaker (manipulator) and covert character of influence and masked layer of linguistic data that is not easily segregated from informational content (ibid).

Another attempt in this regard is made by Coons & Weber (2014:59) who observe that manipulation carries strong connotations of cunning and it characteristically happens unbeknownst to its victim. Moreover, they (ibid: 9) point out that manipulation is deceptively influencing someone against his putative will, and assert the unprecedented fact that what is distinctive about manipulation as a form of influence is not its involvement of distinctive means, i.e., covert means of influence or bad arguments disguised as good arguments, but rather, it has a distinctive effect on its target, that is to say, it plays on the target's weaknesses or it influences him without improving his understanding (ibid: 46).

Another attempt in accounting for manipulation identifies three distinct kinds of manipulation: (1) the manipulation of options (in which options in the environment are modified by increasing or decreasing available options or by rewards or threatening punishments); (2) the manipulation of information (in which the person's perception of options is modified by non-persuasively affecting the person's understanding of the situation); and (3) psychological manipulation (in which the person is influenced by causing changes in mental processes other than those involved in understanding) (Faden & Beauchamp, 2014: 70).

3. Manipulation Parameters

The term 'parameter', here, is used to refer to the four components of manipulation in a manipulative encounter. These parameters, namely: the target (hearer), intention, covertness and speaker's interest, are considered to be as the four manipulation prerequisites, without which, manipulation process will be defeated.

a. The Target (Hearer): Manipulation, as Rudinow (1978: 102) notes, is geared towards influencing the target (hearer) to operate in a direction that under normal circumstances he would likely oppose. Besides, many manipulative strategies are designed in manipulation process to lead the target to act in a way that is not compatible with his intentions, motivations, and best interests. Generally speaking, it might be seen that the veteran manipulator strives to pry, interfere, and influence the decision-making process of the target by giving the latter an impression that he (the target) chooses his actions freely and independently, as he (ibid: 106) appends. To achieve this effect, the manipulator attempts to maneuver the target to perceive the "intentional action" (i.e., the manipulator's goal) as the best available option in the current situation (Goodin, 1980: 8).

However, a manipulative situation can also be seen from another perspective. For Phillips (1997: 18), manipulative interaction invites a meeting between opposing positions: the manipulator's and the target's ones. However, the meeting, or more precisely the clash, is mostly indirect, invisible, and covert. This effect is created by the trickery that is intrinsic to manipulative behavior. The use of morally questionable means, such as seduction, misdirection, and intimidation, contribute to the elusive feature of manipulation (ibid). Such means are used, in Galasinski's (2000: 22) view, "if the target had access to all information relevant in given communicative information, manipulation would be impossible".

In order to be successful, as Baron (2003: 48) specifies, the manipulator feeds the target with false information. This can be done via different manipulation strategies. For instance, 'Manipulation by means of lying' strategy does this in an obvious way; on the basis of which he (the target) makes choices he might not have made if he had known the truth. As such, it seems that the essence of manipulation process is basically withholding information and controlling it.

Viewed from the target's angle, van Dijk (2006: 375) believes that in a way or another, targets need to be defined as lacking crucial resources to resist, detect or avoid manipulation. Crucially, this may involve: incomplete or lack of relevant knowledge, fundamental norms, values and ideologies that cannot be denied or ignored, strong emotions, that make people vulnerable; and social positions, professions, and status that induce people into tending to accept speaker's argument. In addition, he (ibid: 377) asserts that these are typical conditions of the cognitive, emotional or social situation of the communicative event, and also part of the context models of the participants

Actually, one can see that this end could be achieved because, in a manipulative situation (including the contextual factors), the manipulator's spectrum of vision is larger than the target's; which means that the manipulator knows more. Subsequently, the manipulator seeks to maneuver the target to consider possible actions that he (the target) refuses to examine.

A more recent viewpoint compatible with the previous ones is presented by Coon & Weber (2014: 35) who assure that in a manipulative situation, the target who believes that he chooses the best available option freely and independently is actually subject to invisible interference in

his judgment and critical thinking. As such, the result is a successful manipulation.

b. Intention

The second crucial parameter in the characterization of manipulation is that it is always intentional on the part of the speaker; manipulation cannot happen accidentally, i.e., unintentionally, as Blass (2005: 12) confirms. Consequently, in a typical manipulative situation, the manipulator's covert intention cannot be grasped by the hearer; otherwise, manipulation would be self-defeating. Moreover, the concept of intention receives an eminent interest in many pragmatic theories. Relevance theory, for instance, as approached by Sperber & Wilson (1995: 80) admits two levels of intention on the part of the speaker, which must be acknowledged by the hearer in order for the interpretive process to take place: First, the relevance-theoretic idea of ostensive-inferential communication involves the need for the hearer's identification of the speaker's communicative intention; the speaker makes it clear to the hearer that the stimulus is intended to communicate something to him. This kind of identification triggers expectations of relevance (the expectation that the utterance is adequately formatted to communicate relevant assumptions at a lower interpretative cost), and therefore allows for inferential processing to begin (ibid).

Second, the communicated message is not simply decoded but is pragmatically enriched (following a deductive non-demonstrative scheme of information processing). The full interpretation is a set of assumptions corresponding to what the speaker 'means' by the utterance. This set of assumptions represents the informative intention of the speaker, and includes all relevant propositions derived during the interpretative process (ibid: 81).

The centrality of a deceptive intention in manipulation bridges the gap between theories of argumentation and pragmatic account which consider intention as a central aspect of communication (particularly in the field of Gricean pragmatics, as Carston, 2002: 113) assures.

c. Covertness

The other intuitive and widespread view on manipulation holds that in order to succeed, the manipulative attempt must remain covert. Otherwise, manipulation will fail. Maillat & Oswald (2009: 8-28) specify that 'The overall manipulative intention, Local and Global linguistic strategies', as well as 'Discursive strategies' are all elements that may

remain covert in a manipulative utterance. Thus, it is obvious that many aspects of verbal communication can remain covert by the manipulator.

d. Speaker's Interest

The last parameter of manipulation is that of speaker's interest. The notion of interest has been highlighted by many researchers as one key feature of manipulation. The claim is that manipulation is an intrinsically goal-oriented phenomenon designed to satisfy speaker's interest (de Saussure & Schulz, 2005: 126). de Saussure (2005: 119) also emphasizes the connection between speaker's interest and the manipulative attempt:

Communication is manipulative when the speaker retains some relevant information, or provides the correct information in order for the hearer to conclude that he should behave in a way which favors the speaker's interests, without being aware of it.

This means that, as van Dijk (2006: 360) argues, manipulators make others believe or do things that are in the interest of the manipulator and against the best interests of the target.

4. The Central Mechanisms of Manipulation

Manipulation, according to Asya (2013: 4), is based upon mechanisms that compel the listener to perceive verbal messages uncritically and facilitate creation of illusions and misperceptions impacting target's emotions and making him fulfill actions beneficial for the manipulator.

Among all these mechanisms, as she (ibid: 150) states, linguistic ones are crucial for the manipulator to obtain sincere consent. More specifically, of all linguistic ones, fuzziness, in a wide sense, plays an important role in the process of manipulating. These ideas are based on previous ones introduced by other scholars. In this regard, for instance, the concept of fuzziness has been previously explained by Stalnaker (2002: 25). For him (ibid), fuzziness is not only about vague terms, complicated sentences and overuse of metaphors. One of the most important mechanisms used within manipulative discourses is the creation of a global fuzziness, where even parts of the discourse that seem clear and simple lead to interpretative problems for the addressee (ibid).

Besides, as Rocci (2005: 115) states, simplification and fallacies as other manipulation mechanisms. According to this view, simplistic, and usually inductive and false arguments violating logical rules, and which create unmotivated generalizations, can be considered as contributing to the global fuzziness or confusion of the discourse, in spite of the fact that

they are intended to imply a particularly clear and wise thinking. In many other cases, he (ibid: 222) points out, the trouble does not arise from simplification and fallacies but from obscure, vague, metaphorical and mystical expressions. The target faces a conundrum: on the one hand, his natural ability to understand clearly is defeated, and, on the other hand, he is keen to believe in the manipulator's word, because of these non-propositional (emotional) effects, combined with the constant request, on the manipulator's side, to have faith in him.

One more word should be said about emotional appeals in manipulation. Quite often, the discourse is accompanied by other emotional devices than prosody and intonation. Emotions are also triggered by devices at the level of the general attitude of the speaker, and relative to the propositional contents of the utterances, as when the manipulator speaks about concepts that call for fear and hope (Richard&Perloff, 2010: 71). In other words, the target perceives the manipulator's emotion, fallacious or real, which seems fair and motivated, since the manipulated person belongs to a group assumed to be integrated in a common fate with the manipulator, as such, the emotion either comes to be shared by the target or a related emotion is triggered (ibid: 77). In fact, the aforementioned mechanisms of manipulation process seem to imply the utilization of certain pragmatic manipulation strategies subsumed according to manipulation types to be totally accomplished.

5. Manipulation Types

Handelman (2009: 45) illustratively specifies that manipulative behavior is geared towards indirect interference in the decision-making of the target, usually without his / her approval. It is not exactly coercion, persuasion or deception. This elusive phenomenon is settled somewhere in the gray area between these motivating actions. The vagueness of manipulation enables the process to appear in almost infinite forms and under many different guises (ibid)

According to this view, manipulation has been classified into different types, each with its own strategies among which are the following:

a. Verbal Manipulation: is considered by Gardner (2006: 48) as using certain words, voice inflections and tones to control the person someone addresses. It seems that the basic premise is simple; however, there is a great deal of intricate human behavior involved in an effective

verbal manipulation. Differently, a more recent view of verbal manipulation given by Asya (2009: 1) characterizes verbal manipulation as a complex, multistage and phase-by-phase process (as in case of informational propaganda and politics), or it can be a singular, relatively simple act of influencing the target in the course of interpersonal communication. In accordance with this point of view, it seems that manipulation can be either a process with various stages or a product with a single stage. Verbal manipulation includes syntactic and lexico-semantic manipulations.

b. Psychological Manipulation

This type is elucidated by Braiker (2004: 141) as a type of psychological influence that aims to change the intuitive cognition or behavior of others through duplicitous, deceptive, or even abusive strategies. He (ibid: 132) adds, by advancing the interests of the speaker (manipulator), usually at another's expense, such strategies could be considered exploitative, abusive, devious, and deceptive. This is so because psychological influence is generally perceived to be innocuous when it respects the right of the influenced person to accept or decline and is not unduly coercive (ibid). Successful psychological manipulation mainly involves the manipulator's concealing fierce intentions and behaviors. This entails that the manipulator is fully acquainted with the psychological vulnerabilities of the target to determine what strategies are likely to be the most influential (ibid). de Saussure (2005:151) assures that the identification by the hearer of the manipulative intention of the manipulator and seeing whether it is possible for normal humans, equipped with rational devices, to stop using them correctly when confronted by an efficient manipulative situation is one of the crucial problems of manipulation. Thus, it is quite obvious that what is crucial in a manipulative situation is the fact that the goal of manipulators, whatever they themselves believe and regardless of their particular psychological condition, is to convince the hearer of a proposition or set of propositions that should be ruled out by normal information processing and reality checking (ibid). Viewing it differently, Maillat & Oswald (2009: 11) confirm that the crucial psychological aspect of manipulation lies in the way it constrains the hearer's interpretative processes. Thus, an appropriate pragmatic model of manipulation must be proposed to shift the focus on and account for the cognitive (psychological) processes which underlie the interpretation of a

manipulative argument. In line with the aforesaid view, this type of manipulation is the one via which the speaker manipulates hearer's beliefs, such as knowledge, judgements, sentiments and ideologies which in turn control his actions and this is the main concern of cognitive pragmatics .

6. Manipulation and Context Selection

It is necessary here to refer in this regard to Wilson's (2000: 411) supposition that in communicative interactions, specifically, in the cognitive processes of interpretation, the notion of context plays a decisive role in the meanings hearers may derive from the speaker's linguistic productions. In line with Wilson (ibid), it has been claimed by Allott (2002) that manipulative communication takes advantage of the imperfect cognitive mechanisms of information processing (ibid: 156).

Information processing in communication is seen by Rohl (2004: 19) as subjected to uncertainty and errors, if only because the hearer may end up selecting inappropriate contextual assumptions, and also to a resource-bound efficiency constraint balancing cognitive effort and contextual effects. Antecedently, Sperber & Wilson (1995: 267) have seen contextual selection as having certain features. First, contextual selection is a dynamic process whose output is to be taken as a variable; the context of interpretation is not given, but constructed as the linguistic stimuli are processed by the hearer. In other words, the set of assumptions that will be selected for this purpose is the result of a cognitive calculation of some sort. As a matter of fact, according to this relevance –Theoretic viewpoint, they (ibid) assume that this calculation operates by allocating cognitive resources to the mobilization of relevant information, following the economical constraint: the more cognitive effects a representation yields, the more relevant it will be; and consequently, the first representation to yield a satisfactory balance between effort and effect will be most likely selected (ibid: 272). As for the second feature of contextual selection, it is the one which yields representations that adequately comply with this effort/effect trade-off. In other words, contextual selection privileges prominent representations. As such, it is reasonable for the hearer to assume that the assumptions he

considers salient correspond to those the manipulator has had in mind at the time of his utterance by virtue of the default presumption of optimal relevance which, according to relevance theory, governs standard, cooperative, linguistic exchanges (ibid: 276).

A further point presented by relevance theory is that a context is a set of mental representations which are used as premises in the comprehension procedure. These representations may be concerned with various things: social relationships, events, concepts, linguistic items, mental states, general knowledge, perceptual evidence, etc. (Sperber et al., 1995: 31). Accordingly, manipulation is seen as an attempt to control the context selection process of an utterance by making a set of assumptions so prominent so as to make them cognitively inevitable (ibid: 283). In effect, there are mechanisms of contextual selection, and constraints that a speaker can impose through different means, notably by misleading the hearer, by resorting to different strategies, to select some cognitively unavoidable assumptions (Maillat& Oswald, 2009: 348).

7. Pragmatic Theories and Manipulation

Here, the major pragmatic theories are discussed in relation to manipulation. It is believed, by this work, that in so doing, the pragmatic nature of manipulation is revealed in most of its aspects.

To manipulate and to achieve influential goals, the speaker may use manipulative speech acts; breach the maxim(s) of cooperation; convey irrelevant information, utilize certain deictic expressions, maneuver; be engaged in fallacious arguments; be polite, and/or be impolite. It is asserted by many scholars that communication can be studied from different perspectives. Thus, Archer et al (2012:8) sees that there is a tension between socio-cultural (communicative) and cognitive approaches to pragmatics. The cognitive approach can best be represented by relevance theory. The socio-cultural or socio-pragmatic perspective, on the other hand, focuses on how people use language in conversations, debates, speeches and the like. That is to say, how they use language to achieve their social goals. As such, the socio-pragmatic perspective can be represented by a large variety of pragmatic theories. However, as far as manipulation is concerned, socio-pragmatic perspective limits itself to be represented by some of the pragmatic concepts and theories including: speech act theory (henceforth, SAT), politeness/ impoliteness theory, conversational implicatures (henceforth, CI), relevance theory (henceforth, RT), deictic expressions (henceforth,

DE), persuasive argumentation (henceforth, PA), strategic maneuvering (henceforth, SM), fallacies and Pragma-rhetoric.

7.1 Speech Act Theory and Manipulation

Central to Austin's (1962) theory of SA is that utterances can be shown to have both illocutionary force and a perlocutionary effect in addition to their propositional content, that is, their meaning as locutionary acts (ibid: 38). Taking into account that manipulation is a communicative interaction process, manipulators, as such, exploit manipulative speech acts to achieve their goals. This is so owing to the fact that, for manipulators, sending a message is never the ultimate objective of communication, it is only a means of achieving other ulterior aims directed towards control of the target's behavior.

7.1.1 Manipulative Speech Acts

When engaged in such a type of a conversational encounter, manipulators issue certain speech acts which are intended to manipulate their targets. These manipulative speech acts (henceforth, MSAs), are expressed via a variety of utterances which are used directly or indirectly to convey certain manipulative meanings that can create the intentional effect in the target. Leontyev(1981: 273) specifies that when manipulating a person, we aspire to engineer his behavior according to our needs through finding weak spots in his system of activity and affect them (ibid). In other words, the inducement towards proximal verbal or non-verbal reaction is coupled with a mediated manipulation aimed at formation of certain emotions, valuations, orientations on the part of the target that would be compatible with the intention of the manipulator (Sytnik, Krivulya, 1989: 90). Actually, this idea is based on an earlier remark given byMatveeva(1981: 6) which assumes that such orientations are supposed to lead to the organization of such behavior of the listener that the speaker counts for (ibid).

To achieve manipulation in this way, the manipulator may resort to a direct subject- object interaction, i.e., the manipulator openly asserts his claims and demands to the target of manipulation. Alternatively, this kind of interaction can be approached indirectly. As such, it is not directed towards the target.Rather, it is directed towards his environment (Leontyev, 1981: 282). For Leontyev (ibid: 283), the direct method of manipulation includes the forms that have a definite meaning in the

language system that directly expresses corresponding illocution, i.e. the communicative aim of the speaker.

On the basis of such a kind of ideas and the belief that human speech is operative in its nature, a theory of speech manipulation has been developed. As such, in accordance with the aforementioned method, Zheltuhina (2004: 13) asserts that forms of the imperative mood are associated with the meaning of inducement, declarative and interrogative utterances are connected with illocutionary forces of the message and information of request. Conversely, indirect method of expressing communicative intention consists in the usage of linguistic forms to express illocutionary forces not connected with their direct linguistic meaning. Indirect forms, thus, express covert intensions of the manipulator (ibid). Hence, MSAs can be direct or indirect ones.

7.1.1.1 Manipulative Direct Speech Acts

Manipulative Direct Speech Acts (henceforth, MDSA), are identified by Ivanova (1981: 69) as follows with examples:

1. Utterances containing lexical verb in the imperative form:

(1): just think how difficult it is
to save 50,000, 100,000,
200,000 , a million, and then
think of 6,000 million to be
saved in the next nine months...
(Brown in first prime minister
debate 15 April 2010. BBC.
News: online)

The imperative speech act is clearly manifested in this utterance when Brown asks his hearers to think now in a sense of order.

2. Utterances containing the verb 'get' in the imperative form. (see also Haimovich, 1967: 155):

(2): There is got to be a right of recall for people
who are in a constituency and find their MP's
corrupt and parliament doesn't act. (Brown in first
prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News:
online)

The imperative mood is obviously manifested in Brown's utterance in the sense that recall corrupted MPs is an obligatory action that should be taken by every individual.

3. Utterances containing verb to be in the imperative form. (see also Veihman, 2000: 76):

(3): We should all be frank. (Cameron in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: online)

The verb be here conveys an imperative meaning.

4. Utterances containing the verb 'let' and a pronoun in the first person plural, indicating inducement towards cooperative action:

(4): Let's be honest with each other, net inward immigration is falling. (Gordon Brown in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: online)

The verb 'let' is clear in this example accompanied with first person plural to indicate the involvement of the speaker and the hearer in the same issue to assure their cooperative situation.

7.1.1.2 Manipulative Indirect Speech Acts

According to Akimova (1992:189), indirect MSAs (henceforth, MISAs), are also common in the framework of speech interaction. These are utterances, non-imperative in form, but always serve to express the meaning of inducement. This meaning of inducement is associated with these forms in the language system. In this regard, manipulation is based on the use of ISAs, which are focused on prelocutionary effects of what is said (ibid).

akimova (ibid) classifies MISAs as follows:

1. MISAs represented by utterances containing performative verbs, i.e. verbs that do not describe action, but are an action themselves, and this action is carried out through realization of this utterance: declare, promise, advise (ibid: 39). Consider the following example:

(5): We've built up the police force from a period when it was under staffed to a period where they now have more police than ever before. (Brown in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: online)

This utterance can be extended by inserting declare or state as explicit performative SAs to be read as "I hereby declare or state that we've built....." to show the declare SA. Whereas the following example shows promising SA:

- (6): We're going to make you politics better value for money as well as cleaner. (Cameron in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC News: online)

This utterance consists of an implicit SA of promising that can be read, if extended by using an explicit performative verb as 'I hereby promise to make your politics....'. As for advice, consider the following example:

- (7): If your MP is misbehaving and is guilty of corrupt practices and parliament does not act you should have the right to recall that MP. (Brown in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: online)

Here the speaker is advising people to behave accordingly by asserting that they have the right to do so.

2. MISAs of inducement represented by utterances with verbs in the form of the indicative mood conveying the meaning of instruction. (ibid: 41). Below is an illustrative example:

- (8): We're going to cut minister's pay by 5% and freeze it for the whole of the parliament. We're going to cut the size of white whole by a third. And we're going to get rid of some of these quangos. (Cameron in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: online)

This utterance which is in the indicative mood exposes and conveys the sense of giving instructions to the government for the sake of making better economic situation.

3. MISAs represented by utterances containing the verbs in the subjunctive mood. The illocutionary aim of such MISAs is formal request (sometimes with the tinge of pleading), inducement with promise or advice (ibid: 92). For example:

- (9): I need to point out that it is an area where powers are developed to the parliament in Scotland..... (Stewart in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: online)

This utterance contains the verb 'need' to indicate a formal request with a sense of desirability of the speaker to express his point of view.

4. MISAs in the form of speech acts represented by utterances with suppose/supposing. Such utterances express advice, inducement for cooperative action or offer (ibid: 102). Consider the following example:

- (10): I've got to tell you when someone smashes up the bus stop, when someone repeatedly breaks the law, when someone's found fighting

on a Friday or Saturday night, as a magistrate, you've got to have that power for a short prison sentence when you've tried the other remedies. (Cameron in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: online)

Cameron's utterance shows a supposition of an action that should be taken when someone improperly behaves.

5. MISAs in the form of speech acts represented by utterances containing the verb of desire wish (ibid: 105). As illustrated in the example below:

(11): I think it's great we're having these debates, and I hope they go some way to restore some of the faith and some of the trust into our politics, because we badly need that once again in this country. (Cameron in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: online).

6. MISAs of inducement represented by speech acts expressed by utterances with constructions indicating lack of necessity to commit an action (ibid: 106). As shown below:

(12): I will stand with Israel if they are attacked. And this is the reason why, working with Israel, we have created the strongest military and intelligence cooperation between our two countries in history..... and if Israel is attacked, we have their back, not just diplomatically, not just culturally, but militarily. (Obama in a candidates debate, LYNN University in October 22, 2012)

Here the manipulative effect is manifested through Obama's readiness to support and back up Israel if it has been attacked by any outsider force. Since Israel has not been attacked for the time being, so, there is no necessity to render any military or political assistance.

More recently, Brusenskaya et al (2005) make another classification including twenty-seven types of MISAs that might be used by manipulators. Below are the most relevant ones to this study:

1. MISAs represented by utterances with modal verbs expressing a must, necessity, advise, order, command, request (the latest is often marked by please, kindly) (ibid: 133). The following example clarifies this point:

(13): David, answer the question. (Brown in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: online)

This utterance is an order given by Brown to Cameron. It has an implicit performative verb if it is extended by inserting the verb order to be read as 'I hereby order you to answer the question'.

2.MISAs in the form of the speech act of interrogation and represented by utterances with modal verbs can/could, will/would. Such MISAs express requests, requests with could and would being more polite than the requests with can and will (ibid: 134). Consider the following example:

(14):I'd be happy to have you take a look. (Romney in a candidates debate, LYNN University in October 22, 2012)

3.MISAs in the form of the speech act of interrogation represented by a rhetorical question. Such MISAs express prohibition (ibid: 141). Look at the example below:

(15): But do you know one thing I think we really need to do as part of the apology, is to say to the British people, we are going to cut the cost of politics. (Cameron in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: online)

This interrogative utterance is actually not a real question though it starts with interrogation. But rather, it is a rhetorical one which functions as a means of showing prohibition of keeping MP's payments as they are to express some kind of apology to British people.

4.MISAs in the form of the speech act of interrogation expressed by special utterance with the word 'why' having the meaning of advice and used in order to induce the target to perform the correct action (ibid: 149). For example:

(16):Well, I would agree with you that the Tories are damaging so that's why I would ask you to work with us, with us to bring an end to further Tory cuts and another Tory government. (Leanne Wood in 'Opposition Parties Election Debate', 16th April 2015, 8pm. BBC news: online).

5.MISAs represented by indirect questions having the form 'I + wonder' (ibid: 152). Consider the following example:

(17):I just wonder, I'm curious; can I get any recognition from any of you, that the demand side of this equation is that a rapidly rising population due to open-door immigration, started by Ed Miliband's Labour Party in the late 1990s, has directly contributed towards the housing crisis? Is there any flicker of recognition from any of you? Please? One of you, have a go, please (Nigel Farage in 'Opposition Parties Election Debate', 16th April 2015, 8pm. BBC news: online).

6.MISAs expressed by declarative sentences with conditional clauses indicating positive and negative consequences of action completion

(in the latest case a speech act conveys a meaning of warning) (ibid: 156). The following example will be serviceable:

- (18): And if you offer them work when they don't have a work permit which says they are entitled to be in that region, then you are acting illegally. (Clegg in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: online)

This conditional utterance expresses warning as a negative consequence of the action of giving work to people who do not have a permission to work. In this case their action will be illegal.

7.1.2 Manipulation and Truth and Felicity Conditions

Truth and felicity conditions have been proposed as relevant criteria defining manipulative strategies in terms of falsity and insincerity (Rigotti, 2005:67). The main assumption behind this view is that some features of the manipulative message, in terms of the content it encodes, do not comply with the communicative standards of verbal interaction (ibid).

Both truth and felicity conditions are useful in accounting for what happens in manipulative communicative encounters where what is covertly intended is hidden behind what is overtly expressed.

In fact, 'felicity' is concerned with statements which directly twist the vision of reality in the target's mind, it takes the form of disinformation when the manipulator controls the whole (or, at least, a large part of the) communication system and can therefore avoid the risk of being contradicted by possible competitors (ibid).

Typically, manipulation would fall under this category, since it is crucial for a manipulation's success to be taken as a truthful statement. In other words, in a manipulation process, the manipulator misleads the hearer by providing him with a false statement while asserting it as a truth. Previously, Parret (1978) has viewed the definition of manipulation within a speech-act-theoretic framework as causing a problem in the sense that the speech act of manipulation cannot comply with the principle of expressibility of Searle (1969) because it cannot be translated with an explicit performative such as "I manipulate you + propositional content". All in all, manipulation is a kind of speech act which is not meant to be recognized at all, not even indirectly (ibid: 351-352). However, for Maillat & Oswald (2009: 351), from a speech-act-theoretical perspective, manipulation could be envisaged to consider that

manipulation violates felicity conditions, and among them, the sincerity condition in particular (ibid).

7.2 Politeness Theory and Manipulation

According to Brown and Levinson (1987), Politeness Theory is based on the premise that communication is: constitutive of social relationships, and potentially aggressive, i.e., it may damage the face or self-image individuals want for themselves in a determinate socio-cultural system. Consequently, they establish that communicators are expected to soften or mitigate such face-threat inherent to communication in their interactions with others in order to create, maintain, and enhance harmonious social bonds (ibid: 56).

Hence, in their (ibid: 61) conceptualization of face (every individual's feeling of self-worth or self-image that can be damaged, maintained or enhanced through interaction with others), they distinguish between an individual's positive and negative face, with the former referring to the desire to be approved of by others, and the latter alluding to the desire to have freedom of action (ibid: 62).

In this regard, it can be seen that manipulation and politeness are interrelated concepts. Politeness, seen as the linguistic codification of social bonds, necessarily entails the premise that social relations cannot be stripped off communication coming into being in and through it. Taking into consideration that manipulation is a communicative phenomenon like any other, it follows that when a speaker is trying to manipulate another, he is unavoidably relating to the latter at the same time. Speakers in attempting to persuade others employ mitigating strategies in their persuasive appeals, more specifically, positive and negative politeness strategies (pastor, 2011: 9).

Bearing all these theoretical propositions in mind and the results from their anthropological work, they (ibid: 63) devise a framework of conversational strategies they label "politeness strategies" participants are expected to use in their communicative exchanges with one another. As far as this study is concerned, these strategies are as follows:

1. bald-on-record strategies: or highly direct conversational strategies that convey little concern for face and are normally deployed in emergency situations;
2. Positive politeness strategies: which are aimed at mitigating threats to an individual's positive face;

3. negative politeness strategies: or strategies oriented to soften threats to a communicator's negative face; and
4. off-record strategies or highly indirect and implicit strategies such as hints, metaphors, etc. (ibid: 68).

Of these strategies, only positive ones are relevant, in the sense that they play a pivotal role in manipulation process. They are heavily used by manipulators as powerful pragmatic strategies to achieve the intended manipulative end. They are as follows:

1. Positive Politeness Strategies

Positive politeness strategies involve three broad mechanisms: 1) Claim common ground; 2) convey that S and H are cooperative; and 3) fulfil H's want (for some x) (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 102). Only the first and second mechanisms will be tackled.

a. Claim a Common Ground

They (ibid: 103) list eight strategies for this mechanism; it involves both the speaker and the hearer as belonging to a group of people who share specific wants, including goals and values. The speaker may convey that some want (goal, or desired object) of the hearer's is admirable or interesting to the speaker too, or he may stress common membership in a group, thus, emphasizing that both the manipulator and the target belong to some set of persons who share some wants. As illustrated below:

(19): One, more economic development. We should key our foreign aid, our direct foreign investment, and that of our friends, we should coordinate it to make sure that we – we push back and give them more economic development (Romney in a candidates' debate, LYNN University in October 22, 2012).

This example shows that the speaker and the hearer are involved in the same issue. The manipulator considers himself as belonging to a group of people who share specific wants including goals and values. Romney here conveys some wants of the targets and shows his interest and affiliation to them. As far as this study is concerned, the following strategies are the most relevant ones:

1. Notice, attend, to H (his interests, wants, needs, goods) The manipulator here should take notice of aspects of the target's

condition (noticeable changes, remarkable possessions, anything which looks as though the latter would want the speaker to notice and approve of it) (ibid.: 104).

(20):Governor Romney, I'm glad that you recognize that Al Qaida is a threat; because a few months ago when you were asked what's the biggest geopolitical threat facing America, you said Russia, not Al Qaida (Obama in a candidates' debate, LYNN University in October 22, 2012).

Obama here notices the changes in Romney's stance and approves this dramatic changes in the latter's stand.

2. Seek agreement

This strategy allows the speaker either to stress his agreement with the hearer and therefore to satisfy the hearer's desire to be right, or to be corroborated in his opinions by raising safe topics; or to stress his Pseudo-agreement with the use of the spatial diexis "then"(ibid: 112).

(21):You see, I agree with Nick. There's got to be a right of recall for people who are in a constituency and find their MPs corrupt and parliament doesn't act. I agree with that.(Brown in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: online)

This example shows a total agreement between the manipulator and the target. Brown, when showing his agreement with Nick, uses this politeness strategy in a clever way.

3. Presupposition manipulations

The speaker presupposes something when he presumes that it is mutually taken for granted. He speaks as if something is mutually assumed where it is not (ibid: 113). Van Dijk (1989: 31) asserts that this strategy, when used with the aim of manipulation, would have a specific persuasive power, and it is always oriented towards the "mental control" of the target. Pastor (2011: 59) in his turn, agrees with Van Dijk's view confirming that this strategy, when employed, would be directed to the target and has the illocutionary force of offering and promising; acts which are at the service of manipulation, especially in political discourse.Consider the following example:

(22):You wanted to protect the paymasters of the trade union. Paymasters, you wanted to protect Lord Ashcroft in his offshore

haven in Belize....I think that's a betrayal, I think that's a con. I think you deserve the right to sack your MPs when they're corrupt, but you also deserve a politics where we finally get the big money out of politics altogether (Clegg in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: online)

This is a clear example of presupposition manipulation. Participants in this debate are well acquainted with the corruption in the parliament. So, Clegg here accuses the target to protect the tycoons in the country while it is assumed that those corrupted people should be sacked as a mutual presupposed action.

b. Convey that S and H are cooperative

This is the second major class of positive-politeness mechanisms according to Brown and Levinson (1987: 125). This mechanism reflects:

the want to convey that the speaker and the addressee are cooperatively involved in the relative activity. If the speaker and the hearer are cooperating, then they share goals in some domain and thus to convey that they are cooperators can serve to redress H's positive-face want (ibid).

This is done by claiming some kind of flexibility between the speaker's and hearer's wants as shown in the example below:

(23): Number two, make sure that they are standing by our interests in Israel's security, because it is a true friend and our greatest ally in the region. Number three, we do have to make sure that we're protecting religious minorities and women because these countries can't develop unless all the population, not just half of it, is developing. Number four, we do have to develop their economic -- their economic capabilities (Obama in a candidates' debate, LYNN University in October 22, 2012).

This mechanism is cleverly used here by Obama as he wants to convey a message that he and the addressee are cooperatively involved in the same activity. They share goals in some domains such as standing by America's interest in Israel security and protecting religious minorities

and woman. This politeness mechanism, as a manipulative tool, can be achieved through out the following strategies:

1. Offer, Promise

The speaker shows his good intention in satisfying the hearer's positive-face wants by using offers and promises strategy even if they are false (ibid). For example:

(24): But we can't kill our way out of this mess. We're going to have to put in place a very comprehensive and robust strategy to help the -- the world of Islam and other parts of the world, reject this radical violent extremism, which is -- it's certainly not on the run (Romney in a candidates' debate, LYNN University in October 22, 2012).

2. Include both S and H in the Activity

This can be done by using an inclusive 'we', when the manipulator really means 'you' or 'me', he can call upon the cooperative assumptions and thereby redress FTAs." (ibid.: 127).

(25): We see in -- in Libya, an attack apparently by, I think we know now, by terrorists of some kind against -- against our people there. Our hearts and -- and minds go out to them (Romney in a candidates' debate, LYNN University in October 22, 2012).

The repetition of the inclusive 'we' and its variant 'our' gives an indication that the manipulator involves himself with his target to show cooperative assumptions and to maintain FTAs.

7.3 Impoliteness Theory and Manipulation

Within the domain of pragmatics, the concept of impoliteness comprises a new and interesting field of studies next to and complementing politeness studies. Impoliteness is considered to be a break from the hypothesized norms of a community of practice. It is attributed to a speaker on the basis of assessments of his intention and motivations, as Mills (2005:122) affirms.

Primarily, the theory has first been proposed by Culpeper (1996) who defines impoliteness as "the opposite of politeness" (ibid: 344). However, one can elaborate on this and consider impoliteness as an

exercise of power which is, in turn, expressed through language and cannot be explained without contextualization. Culpeper (ibid) argues that:

A powerful participant has more freedom to be impolite because he/she can (a) reduce the ability of the less powerful participant to retaliate with impoliteness e.g. through the denial of speaking rights and (b) threaten more severe retaliation should the less powerful participant be impolite. (ibid:354)

Posteriorly, Culpeper (2005: 355) whose initial work is based on Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness reformulates his model of impoliteness as "the parasite of politeness". Nevertheless, he (ibid) changes his model in order to incorporate with the discursive nature of social interaction. In this regard, impoliteness can be seen to damage a person's identity and face.

However, previous to the theory reformulation date, Culpeper et al (2003) importantly note that impoliteness is the use of strategies which are designed to attack the hearer's face and thereby cause social conflict and disharmony. Impoliteness, as such, by a specific kinds of behaviors in specific context (ibid:1550).

In fact, the importance of context as invoked by Culpeper et al (ibid) can be seen as a confirmation to what Fraser and Nolan (1981:96) has previously asserted with regard to context:

No sentence is inherently polite or impolite we often take certain expressions to be impolite, but it is not the expressions themselves but the conditions under which they are used that determine the judgment of politeness.

In line with Culpeper's (ibid) claim that impoliteness is the opposite of politeness, Elen (2001:45) argues that politeness and impoliteness are two facets of the same coin. Here, he means that there are always two sides to whatever kind of language behavior we engage in. One side is positive (politeness) and the other one is negative (impoliteness). As far as impoliteness is concerned, it is believed that it focuses on intention and reception.

In his turn, Mills (2003:124) disagrees with Culpeper and Elen asserting that impoliteness is not the opposite of politeness but she suggests that persons can deal with impoliteness by using the same analytical concepts as those relevant to the analysis of politeness. Furthermore, impoliteness can be expressed directly and indirectly; directness is often characterized as face-threatening acts (ibid).

More recently, Culpeper(2011:63) explicates that impoliteness often involves a clash and conflict of behaviors associated with particular context and refers to inappropriate behavior. Thus, impoliteness, like manipulation, includes intentional face-attack.

The relationship between impoliteness and manipulation is revealed throughout the five impoliteness strategies as they proposed by Culpeper(1996: 356) that will be tackled in details in the next chapter. The impoliteness strategies used by speakers can be seen as implied strategies within the manipulation process. They are as follows:

1. Bald on record impoliteness: is seen as typically being deployed where there is much face at stake and where there is an intention on the part of the speaker to attack the face of the hearer and/or where the speaker does not have the power to utter an impolite utterance.

(26): I was shocked and I was sickened by what I saw. I'd been brought up to believe by my parents that you act honestly, and you act fairly and you act responsibly. As just as the bankers were irresponsible, so too were members of parliament (Brown in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: online)

This is a very good example about bald on record strategy. Brown here conveys little concern of face of the hearer using his power which authorizes him to have more freedom to be impolite. He is rude when he uses the words 'shocked' and 'sickened'. And he shows himself that he was brought up in a family that teaches him that a man should all the time be honest in his work. That is why he shows his discontent in this tough way.

2. Sarcasm or mock politeness: constitutes the use of individual or combined strategies and remains on the surface and appears to be appropriate. On the surface level, the utterances sound polite but their meaning is the opposite. Here, the face threatening acts are performed with the use of politeness strategies that are obviously insincere (ibid:49)

(27): So, what -- what we need to do with respect to the Middle East is strong, steady leadership, not wrong and reckless leadership that is all over the map. And unfortunately, that's the kind of opinions that you've offered throughout this campaign, and it is not a recipe for American strength, or keeping America safe over the long haul (Obama in a candidates' debate, LYNN University in October 22, 2012).

Obama here is criticizing and mocking at Romney's strategy which offered, according to Obama, wrong and reckless leadership to America. On the surface, this utterance seems polite while its meaning is totally impolite. As such, Obama performs a FTA as a strategy of manipulation to achieve his aim.

3. Withhold politeness: In this strategy, the speaker does not perform a politeness act where the hearer would expect one.

(28): This is not correct. The Taliban changed their tactics. We brought in helicopters from Iraq. We had to reprocess them because they were not suitable for the terrain in Afghanistan (Brown in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC.News: online).

Cameron, in the same debate, accuses the government that it does not provide enough helicopters required for the front line in Afghanistan. Brown expresses his severe reaction towards this accusation by saying frankly 'this is not correct'. Thus he does not perform a politeness act where the hearer expect him to do so.

In this respect, impoliteness strategies used by speakers can be seen as implied strategies within the manipulation process. In other words, manipulators use manipulative strategies that can be implicitly considered as impolite. Not to mention that manipulation itself, as a process, implies impoliteness since it damages the hearer's face wants, for, as previously mentioned, manipulators aim to achieve goals that serve their interests best regardless of the hearer's interests. Manipulation, like impoliteness, objects the acceptable and appropriate social behavior.

7.4 Conversational Implicature and Manipulation

Another pragmatic approach to manipulation concerns the conversational implicature (henceforth, CI), formulated by Grice (1975, 1989), which requires contributions to conversations to be truthful, relevant, informative and relatively complete.

The term implicature came into use by the philosopher Paul Grice in his seminal article *Logic and Conversation* (ibid). Grice deals with the speaker's meaning from two perspectives: what is said and what is implicated. According to Meibauer (2006: 365), the first perspective belongs to the realm of semantics (truth-conditional semantics) since it can be assigned a truth condition within the true/false dialectic. What is implicated, on the other hand, could not be covered by semantics and it

belongs to the realm of pragmatics because it is part of the speaker's meaning (ibid).

To give an idea about what is said as distinct from what is implicated, it might be useful to refer to Grice (1975, 1989). He (ibid: 47) suggests that speakers abide by a tendency toward being cooperative in their speech. This tendency is what Grice calls "The Cooperative Principle" which states: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (ibid). The Cooperative Principle is supported by the four maxims of Quantity, Quality, Relevance, and Manner (Cf. Grice, 1975: 1989).

For Grice (ibid), any divergence or break of one or more of these maxims can lead into a break in the communication process but again taken the cooperative principle into their consideration, speakers understand that their partners are cooperative and the seeming break is in fact to tell more than what literal words can do (Cited in Levinson, 1983: 102)

In manipulation process, implicature has its very potent nature where it enables the manipulator to maneuver and manipulate what s/he wants to convey indirectly. Manipulators (especially politicians) are always aware of the menace of their language so that they tend to express their messages implicitly to avoid being facilely judged for what is said.

For de Saussure (2005: 6), communication is manipulative when the speaker retains some relevant information, or provides the correct information but in order for the target to conclude that he should behave in a way which favours the speaker's interests, without being aware of it. Therefore, to manipulate, is firstly, to communicate the relevance of things that are not relevant by themselves, and / or retain actually relevant information (ibid).

Additionally, the manipulator may not respect the maxim of quality, either on the side of what is said, or on the side of what is implicated. The manipulator, in the strongest sense of the word, is always aware, at least to some extent, of the falsehood of what he says, implies or suggests (ibid). In brief, as Grice (1975, 1989) has already assured, manipulative messages encoded by the target involve deviations from what can be considered rational and cooperative communication. They mislead targets by covertly violating the principles that underlie and guide conversational understanding. In doing so, manipulators use ISAs and/or rhetorical devices (ibid: 22). In other words, in manipulation

process, because the violation is not made apparent to the target, the latter is misled by his assumption that the manipulator is adhering to the CP and its maxims, hence, be manipulated.

Based on this view, Maillat & Oswald (2009: 350) have recently pointed out that manipulators covertly violate the Cooperative Principle and possibly the conversational maxims (ibid).

7.5 Relevance Theory and Manipulation

Relevance theory may be seen as an attempt to work out in details one of Grice's central claims that "an essential feature of most human communication, both verbal and non-verbal, is the expression and recognition of intentions" (Grice 1989: 18).

According to Sperber & Wilson (1994: 2), relevance theory is based on a definition of relevance and two principles of relevance: a Cognitive Principle that human cognition is geared to the maximization of relevance, and a Communicative Principle that utterances create expectations of optimal relevance (ibid: 3).

Sperber & Wilson (ibid: 249) state that an utterance is considered to be relevant when it connects with background information available to the hearer in order to yield conclusions. For instance, by answering a question he had in mind, improving his knowledge on a certain topic, settling a doubt, confirming a suspicion, or correcting a mistaken impression (ibid). For them (ibid: 251) an utterance is relevant to an individual when its processing in a context of available assumptions yields a positive cognitive effect (ibid).

These effects are supposed to be achieved with a minimum of processing effort on the part of the speaker. The motivation to involve cognitive effort is based on the assumption of achieving those effects in the hearer (ibid).

For Blakemore (1994: 212), the relevance-theoretic account of cognition and communication has practical implications for pragmatic manipulation. A manipulative utterance meaning, to be linguistically encoded, must be contextually enriched (ibid).

As far as the manipulator's intention is concerned, Sperber and Wilson (1994: 273) distinguish two levels of intention – an informative intention and a communicative intention. The former makes certain assumptions manifest to the audience whereas the latter involves only the recognition of his informative intention. The informative intention on the other hand is fulfilled whenever the intended assumptions are part of the

hearer's cognitive environment (ibid) (see also Carston, 2002: 155). According to Galasinski (2000: 22), manipulation can be manifested through the strategies of omission and/or commission:

a. Manipulation by Omission

According to Grice's cooperation principle (1975, 1989), the speaker has to be as informative as required by the communicative situation without being redundant or ambiguous. Within argumentation, the manipulator has a further means of moulding his utterances by withholding information or expressing it in a way that suits intended manipulative effects. Under 'omission' falls information that is withheld in spite of the fact that it could have been relevant to the target in a particular situation. Omission can be passive, in which case the manipulator is simply withholding information. By doing so he is preventing the target from acquiring beliefs he would have otherwise been able to establish. He is not trying to distort or present a false reality, as Blass (2005: 190) states.

(30): The chairman of the Republican Party thinks we ought to change a few things (Kerry in October 8, 2004 Debate. The Second Bush-Kerry Presidential Candidates 'Debate).

To avoid redundancy and ambiguity, the manipulator may resort to various strategies to mould his utterances by withholding information or expresses it in a way that suits his manipulative effect. And that what Kerry does in this speech. He doesn't give full information about what are these few things.

b. Manipulation by Commission

Manipulation by commission happens if a manipulator is active; i.e., his goal is to make the hearer acquiring or continuing a belief that he intends the latter to accept. This can be done either explicitly or implicitly. Under explicit commission fall lies, half-truths (distortions), evasions and equivocations. Under implicit commission fall misleading underspecified explicatures and false implicatures (ibid).

1. Explicit Commission

a. Lies: For Galasinski (2000), a lie is a message intended and meant to mislead the hearer. It is not so much the case that lies are objectively false, but that the manipulator merely represents a particular set of beliefs under a higher level representation of

disbelief in the truth or relevance of the lower level representation that he/she wants the hearer to accept as relevant. The lower level representation that he/she knows is not relevant information for the hearer is communicated ostensibly, with the intention to make the latter believe and act upon his overt informative intention. The higher-level representation of disbelief is kept covert and so are the real facts that might have been relevant for the hearer. All of this is fully intentional which rules out communicative acts that are false, but not intended to mislead, as Blass (2005: 172) affirms. Below is an illustrative example:

(31): We're going to have to put in place a very comprehensive and robust strategy to help the -- the world of Islam and other parts of the world, reject this radical violent extremism, which is -- it's certainly not on the run (Romney in a candidates debate, LYNN University in October 22, 2012).

Romney conveys a message by which he intends to mislead the target. By doing so, he wants his words to be accepted as facts. Thus, makes his target believe and acts upon the manipulator's (Romney's) overt informative intention. All Muslims are sure that American Government does not work in favor of Islam and Muslims

b. Half-truths and Distortions: In his attempt to clarify the concept of 'half-truths', Turner (1975: 36) claims that: "exaggerations are overstatements giving more information than required; half-truths, on the other hand, deceive by providing less information" (ibid). As such, they can be seen as 'understatements'.

Others have categorized the phenomenon of 'distortions' under exaggeration, minimization, or equivocation and define them as 'manipulation with truth' (Metts, 1989: 18 & Taillard, 2000: 44). In line with those scholars, Buller & Burgoon (1994) view half-truths and distortions as having a part in pragmatic manipulation (ibid: 18). This view is also asserted by Burgoon, et al. (1996: 10) who propose that equivocation is characterized by ambiguity, indirectness or irrelevance and depersonalization, which also includes evasion. The equivocation that plays a role in manipulation is like lies, exaggeration (overstatement) and half-truths (understatement).

In a later work, Wilson and Sperber (2000) point out that to be incompletely truthful often saves the manipulator processing effort and

might therefore be more relevant than veracious truth (ibid: 71). So, they (ibid: 98) add, there is a need to differentiate between phenomena that are used for achieving relevance more easily than those that are meant for deception. Simply because truth is not always what people are out for; they are after relevance. So what manipulation is about, is not about making the hearer believe untruth but to control the beliefs that he/she may accept and may act upon. manipulators may withhold relevant information from their target that he/she could accept as relevant (ibid: 193).

2. Implicit information

According to Blass (2005: 195), manipulation can also occur through implied information. This implied information can be on the propositional level (explicature) or it can be on the implicature level (misleading intended assumptions and/or conclusions). This strategy will not be included in the model of analysis for it is implicitly exist within the theory of CI.

7.6 Deictic Expressions (Indexicals) and Manipulation

Levinson (1983:55) sees that deixis belongs to the domain of pragmatics because it directly concerns the relationship between the structure of language and the contexts in which they are used (ibid). According to him (ibid: 38), deixis can be typified into five categories: time, place, social, discourse and person. Of these, only person deixis will be explained, on account of its relevance to the data being analyzed. Moreover, he (ibid: 62) claims that person deixis is concerned with "the encoding role of participants in the speech event in which the utterance in question is delivered" (ibid). Then, He (ibid: 41) proceeds by further categorizing plural pronouns by encoding them as "we" and "they". He makes a distinction between two types of the first person plural pronoun we. One is called the inclusive we, which includes the speaker and the hearer when the speaker is one person asking another about something they share or would both like to do. The other is the exclusive we, which excludes the speaker from the hearer (ibid).

The use of "I, you, we" continuum is an effort by the speaker to persuade the hearer to crossover to his ideological position, and accordingly, to achieve his manipulative purpose; since they are an effective means that enhances the legitimization of the speaker's action, as Chilton and Schaffner (1997: 216) assert. For instance, the all-inclusive "we" can be used by the speaker to bring on to his side, the hearer, in his

ideological and power positioning. "We", and its variants, "our", "ours" and "us", therefore represent, what Chilton (2004:140) defines as "the coalescence of the voice of the person with the voice of the people" (ibid). Consider the following example:

(32): We have all made personal and collective sacrifice not just to enthrone peace.... But also to consolidate our democracy...(Gordon Brown in first prime minister debate 15 April 2010. BBC. News: online)

The use of person deixis to manipulate hearers has also been pointed out by Wilson (1990: 21) and Fairclough (2001: 33), who assert that its selection in political discourse is never arbitrary. The use of certain pronouns is strategic in the sense that politicians chose one deictic category rather than another to express the degree of their personal involvement. This is consonant with the manipulation of the first person plural *we*, which can designate the speaker and one or more other persons. Or it may refer to persons other than the speaker (ibid). In fact, Wilson (ibid: 87) and Fairclough (ibid: 22) confirm that manipulators (especially politicians) use person deixis to manipulate people, make alliances, attack, or express an ideological basis. Besides, identity and membership may be expressed through the use of person deixis as a persuasive technique. This determines who belongs to the group and who does not. Typical group members share common features that distinguish them from other groups. Manipulators tend to emphasize this difference through the categorization of groups using person deixis (ibid: 33). Accordingly, to achieve his manipulative goals, the manipulator utilizes certain deictic expressions which may create an elusive and deceptive effect on the hearer. In this regard, manipulators' purposes ranging from personal to political, from persuasive to manipulative, all are essentially dependent on both the context of production and the speaker's intentions.

Recently, Mey (2009: 54) denotes deictic expressions the name of "indexicals" or "indexical expressions", he (ibid: 178) visualizes them as linguistic pointers which orientate reference in an utterance to the contextual coordinates of the utterance (ibid). As such, an indexical is generally understood to be the encoding of the spatiotemporal context and subjective experience of the encoder in an utterance. In sum, the use of person deixis by the speaker convinces and subsequently manipulates the

hearer, influence him, persuade him to think like the manipulator and to accept his ideas unquestionably.

7.7 Persuasive Argumentation and Manipulation

According to Eemeren, et al. (1997), argumentation is a reasonable activity that is socially and verbally meant to increase or decrease the hearers' acceptance of a controversial position by presenting a reasonable justification for such a position (ibid: 1). In argumentation, as Sperber(2000b: 5) argues, the speaker can give reasons as to why it is worthwhile for the hearers to accept his assertion. Even if the hearer has no confidence in the manipulator, he can inspect the reasons by logical means and will accept them if he recognizes their consistency (ibid). (see also: Eemeren et al. 2004; Cook, 2009; and Nettle & Roque 2012).

For Reisigl and Wodak(2001: 44), argumentation is seen as one of five discursive 'strategies' involved in positive-Self and negative-Other representation. By 'strategy' it is meant an intentional plan of language practices, that is, systematic ways of using language, which serve to achieve particular social, political, psychological linguistic and/or manipulative effects (ibid). However, for other scholars, there is a confusion between 'argumentation' and 'argument'. Toulmin (2003: 12), for instance, views argumentation as including many arguments and participants in a dispute. It is, for him (ibid), the line of thinking or reasoning to get to a logical conclusion and a discussion of different ideas. Similarly, Walton (2006: 2) differentiates between the term 'argument' and 'argumentation' by claiming that the latter is a broad concept that denotes a dynamic process of connecting arguments together in a dialogue.

According to Walton (2007), an argument manifests itself through the three fields of logic, rhetoric, and dialectic. Logic is the science of reasoning that studies formal inferential links between sets of propositions designated as premises and conclusion of an argument (ibid: 23). Dialectic, usually taken to be a branch of logic, analyzes arguments given in a text of discourse, including fallacious arguments, evaluating them as weak or strong by examining criticisms of them. Rhetoric studies persuasive arguments based on the beliefs, commitments, or values of the target audience to be persuaded (ibid: 31). In other words, one can say that logic explains the fact that arguments are products created by speakers as they are engaged in an argumentative situation; dialectic views argumentation as a process of cooperation between two

interlocutors; and rhetoric provides means of persuading others. Thus, the aim of rhetorical argumentation is to persuade others by picking premises that represent the values of the specific audience. (see also: Tindle, 2004: 171).

Persuasive argumentation, as Davidson (2001: 15) has previously asserted, combines the aims of argumentation with those of persuasion. The two aims do not conflict because one can, in certain cases, achieve a change in disposition to act simply by accepting a reasonable agreement. However, these aims complement each other because those of persuasion go beyond the simple support of a position, since they actually seek to provoke an action. In this way, argumentation's epistemic aim joins up with the pragmatic one of persuasive effectiveness (ibid). Furthermore, persuasive argumentation calls for a wide range of means (strategies) that are combined together. Such a combination therefore shows the compatibility of means that are usually considered as opposed: those of argumentation, mainly reasonableness, and those to which persuasion is ordinarily connected, pathos and ethos, but also and more generally, the entirety of rhetoric's resources (Nettle, 2011: 212).

Persuasive argumentation, as such, can be defined as the communicational process by which a speaker seeks to put the hearer in a favorable disposition that leads the latter to commit to an action presented as desirable for him but in fact, it serves the speaker's interests best. This disposition is obtained by a freely consented acceptance that should lead to a change in behavior. The acceptance results from the examination of the reasons given by the speaker, among which emotions can also play a role. Accordingly, this leads one to claim that persuasive argumentation, as a process, resembles at a high level the manipulation process in the sense that in both processes, relatively; the same stages, strategies and intentional stance are exploited. The stages proposed in an earlier work by Eemeren & Grootenboer (2009: 482) are as follows:

1. The confrontation stage: at this stage the traditional tension between dialectic and rhetoric is down-played and the relation presented as complementary and useful (ibid: 483).
2. The opening stage: each party in this stage is directed at creating the most advantageous (procedural and material) starting point, for instance, by calling to mind or eliciting helpful concessions from the other party (ibid: 485).
3. The argumentation stage: here, each party that acts as a protagonist chooses a strategic line of defense that involves a selection from

available loci that suits that party best, and each party that acts as an antagonist chooses the line of attack that seems most effective in light of the dialectical situation (ibid: 489).

4. The concluding stage: each party will direct its efforts toward achieving the conclusion of the discourse desired by that party, for instance, by pointing out what the consequence is of accepting a certain complex of arguments (ibid: 941).

The persuasive strategies (appeals) used in argumentations are those proposed by Aristotle (1967), namely; logos, ethos and pathos.

However, 'persuasion' has been differentiated from 'manipulation' by many scholars. Greimas & Courte's (1979: 221) is the first who asserts the necessity of differentiating persuasion from manipulation, all the more so because the two concepts are often mixed or closely tied (ibid). Earlier, persuasion was recognized by Searle (1969) as a directive speech act in which the speaker's purpose is to get the hearer to commit himself to some course of action. In other words, persuasion is an attempt to make the world matches the words (ibid: 66).

For Conly (1990: 7), a persuasion situation involves the speaker who attempts to persuade the hearer to take a certain action. Whether or not the hearer should accept the speaker's suggestion depends on information possessed by the speaker. In such a situation, the speaker often presents hard evidence to support his position (ibid).

Lakoff (2005: 48) differently sees persuasion as the non-reciprocal attempt or intention of one party to change the behavior, feelings, intentions, or viewpoint of another by communicative means. The situation for Van Dijk (2006: 360) is different as he confirms that without the negative associations, manipulation could be a form of (legitimate) persuasion. The crucial difference in this case is that in persuasion the interlocutors are free to believe or act as they want, depending on whether or not they accept the arguments of the persuader, whereas in manipulation recipients are typically assigned a more passive role: they are victims of manipulation (ibid). This negative consequence of manipulative discourse typically occurs when the hearers are unable to grasp the real intentions or to see the full consequences of the beliefs or actions advocated by the manipulator (ibid: 366).

This fact justifies Blass's (2006: 195) claim that while it is possible in persuasion to have the persuasive intention be overt, and have the content of the informative intention covertly embedded under the intention of persuasion, the manipulative intention is always covert, and will have the

informative intention embedded under the manipulative intention (ibid). However, it seems that the embedded part of the persuasive intention is very different from the deceptive manipulative higher order intention, which is always bad.

To sum up, persuasion and manipulation are involved whenever there is a resistance to a particular issue of the receivers. Manipulation techniques tend to constraint and paralyze hearers' freedom of thought and free will, and to a mental level, they can be a form of deprivation of liberty.

7.8 Strategic Maneuvering and Manipulation

The concept of strategic maneuvering has been defined by Eemeren and Houtlosser(2001: 151) as exponents: "attempt to make use of the opportunities available in the dialectical situation for steering the discourse rhetorically in the direction that serves their own interests best". As far as the dealing with argumentation which is the basic field of SM is concerned, Toulmin(2001: 11) shows that there is a communicative gap between a dialectical approach and a rhetorical approach in studying it. To bridge the gap between these two approaches, pragmatic techniques are used to show that rhetorical and dialectical approaches are, in fact, complementary in the sense that both aim at persuasion (ibid).

In fact, all theories of argumentation, and particularly those that are normative in force, stress the underlying reasonableness of the activity and ways in which this should be achieved and maintained. The relationship between SM and Manipulation can be revealed by shedding light on aspects of SM through which manipulation manifests itself. According to Eemeren (2010: 5), the analysis of strategic maneuvering divides the rhetorical dimension into three inseparable aspects: topical potential, audience demand and presentational device.

1. Topical Potential: This is the first condition every strategic maneuver should meet to be considered reasonable. It pertains to the topical choice. Eemeren (2010: 111) explains that speakers, in their attempt to remain dialectically reasonable and at the same time rhetorically effective, make a topical selection that is most favorable to their position. That is to say, they will select materials from those available according to what they believe best advances their own interests. This also characterizes manipulation process; the

manipulator uses in the first stage this strategy to achieve goal(s) that serves his interests best.

2. Audience Demand: This is the second dimension, for optimal rhetorical result. The moves must in each stage of the discourse be adapted to audience demand in such a way that they comply with the hearers' good sense and preferences. Argumentative moves that are entirely appropriate to some may be inappropriate to others. In general, adaptation to audience demand will consist of an attempt to create empathy or 'communion' (Emeren, 2010: 115). Moreover, strategic adaptation to audience demand may be achieved by quoting arguments the listeners agree with or by referring to argumentative principles they adhere to (ibid: 201).

Accordingly, for an optimal manipulation result, the manipulator must adapt to audience demand in such a way that his claims comply with the hearers' good sense and preferences. It has also been asserted that showing awareness of the hearer's face is the best means of adaptation which can be achieved through the politeness strategies.

3. Presentational Devices: Another variety of strategic maneuver of special interest to pragma-dialectics is what Eemeren has called a "presentational device", "the phrasing of moves in the light of their discursive and stylistic effectiveness" (ibid: 242). A presentational device a speaker utilizes is to present an argumentation in one way rather than another so as to gain rhetorical advantage (ibid).

Eemeren (ibid: 219) makes it clear that making use of presentational choices as manifestation of strategic maneuvering refers to utilizing the pragmatic strategies as a variation to steer the discourse toward the achievement of certain communicative and interactional effects. Thus, one might claim that strategic maneuvering shares with manipulation process the exploitation of the presentational devices that help the manipulator achieving his manipulative goals. In addition, approached in this way, one can also see that strategic maneuvering shares with persuasive argumentation and manipulation the criterion of effectiveness and reasonableness. To maneuver or to manipulate, in both cases the speaker utilizes the power of speaking as well as the art of speaking to achieve his persuasive and/or manipulative goals. To put it more precisely, manipulators maneuver in order to succeed in twisting the hearer's world without being discovered. They attempt to maneuver the target to perceive the intentional action (the manipulator's goal) as the best available option in the current situation. Hence, they attempt to

achieve the motivating effect smoothly and elegantly. Because, in fact, in order to succeed in this regard, a lie has to seem true, an insincere promise must seem authentic, a fallacy must look like a sound argument, a secondary aspect has to appear as essential and deviant or reductive reading of a keyword must look straightforward and appropriate. In short: what is negative has to be somehow disguised as something positive.

One way of distinguishing in SM is what is referred to as ‘fallacy’ which is a kind of derailment of SM. Fallacy has a strong relationship with manipulation as shown below.

7.8.1 Fallacies and Manipulation

Walton (1995) defines fallacy as “an argument that falls short of some standard of correctness; as used in a context of a dialogue; but that, for various reasons, has a semblance of correctness about it in context; and poses a serious obstacle to the realization of the goal of a dialogue” (ibid: 23). Eemeren and Grootendorst (1999) on the other hand, consider fallacy as a derailment of strategic maneuvering. Recently, Eemeren & Houtlosser (2009) develop what Eemeren and Grootendorst (ibid) have said about fallacy explicating that strategic maneuvering has ‘derailments’. Such derailments occur when a rule for critical discussion has been violated in the discourse. Viewed from this perspective, ‘fallacies’ are considered to be violations of critical discussion rules that come about as derailments of strategic maneuvering (ibid: 14).

Moreover, although in strategic maneuvering aiming for dialectical objectives and trying to reach rhetorical aims can go together, this does not mean that in practice there is always a perfect balance between pursuing the two objectives (ibid: 13). Previously, Johnson (2000: 4) has seen that fallacies can sometimes pass unnoticed, however, he (ibid) explicates that fallacious argument is the one that violates one of a good argument rules. He (ibid: 208) specifies two types of fallacious arguments: those of a dialectical tier and others of the illative core. Dialectical tier is that part of the argument where the arguer is able to discharge obligations on his opponent (ibid: 209). Whereas illative core is a structure composed of the elements of premise, warrant and conclusion (ibid). Moreover, he (ibid: 265) provides four criteria for evaluating fallacious arguments of the illative core level: acceptability, truth, relevance and sufficiency. That is to say, if an argument constitutes a violation of one or more of these criteria or rules it will then be

considered as fallacious. As such, it is a pragmatic strategy used by manipulators to achieve their desired goals.

8. Conclusions

On the basis of what has been discussed above in relation to manipulation and its relationship with pragmatic theories and issues, it can be concluded that:

1. Manipulation is a communicative pragmatic process in which the speaker (manipulator) maliciously and covertly intends to influence the beliefs, desires, emotions or behaviors of the hearer (target), usually against his best interests, by using certain manipulative pragmatic strategies.
2. To achieve his influential goals, the manipulator resorts to fallacious arguments, breaches the maxim(s) of cooperation, uses certain pragmatic manipulative speech acts, conveys irrelevant information, utilizes certain deictic expressions, acts impolitely and/or strategically maneuvers his target.
3. The persuasive appeals of (logos, ethos, and pathos) play a pivotal role in manipulation process. They best serve manipulators in achieving the desired manipulative end.
4. The conclusions above indicate that manipulators make use of various pragmatic means and do not confine themselves to cognitive and behavioral ones which verifies the hypothesis that manipulation is essentially pragmatic in nature rather than cognitive or behavioral.

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