The transitional phase and its challenges as Islamists come to power in Tunisia

Abstract

Following the revolution and the escape of former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on January 14, 2011, Tunisia moved into a first transitional phase in which two governments were formed. One of them was headed by the last prime minister under Ben Ali, Mohamed Ghannouchi, which could be considered the de facto government. However, the street’s rejection of it forced it to resign. Then came the second government, headed by Beji Caid Essebsi, which tried to manage the country’s affairs until elections were held for a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution for the country, laying the foundation for building a democratic state in Tunisia and establishing a democratic Tunisian republic in which rights and freedoms are protected. Essebsi’s government actually completed the task assigned to it, and Tunisia moved into a second transitional phase with the Islamists, represented by the Ennahda Islamic Movement, winning the largest number of seats in Parliament, although it was less than the movement’s ambitions. Thus, the Tunisian Islamist movement came to power amidst an Arab reality in which the spectacle of political Islam seemed to be the primary concern for observers. It appeared to be the beneficiary of the Arab revolutions, having risen to power in both Tunisia and Egypt following popular uprisings. In Morocco, the Arab revolutions led to the ruling regime opening up politically to previously restricted political forces, particularly Islamists. This led to the formation of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (JDP) as a government in 2011 after a new constitution was drafted. Islamists won parliamentary elections in Tunisia, as well as parliamentary and presidential elections in Egypt, despite the subsequent dissolution of parliament. They now govern in these countries. Are we, therefore, heading toward Islamist forces dominating power in Arab countries? This is the concern that worries a large segment of leftists and secularists. This is why skepticism about the revolutions themselves is growing, and there is hesitation in supporting change. Many sectors are concerned about the Islamists' perceived long-term rule and fear their dominance. This leads to the assertion that the Islamists' rise to power means they will remain in power for a long time. This is certainly a bleak picture based on some previous experiences, but it does not stem from the existing reality, nor from the objective circumstances that allowed these people to come to power, and thus from understanding their ability to rule in the first place, i.e. their ability to lead the government and act comfortably and without disturbances. In a revolutionary situation that began in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, and spread very quickly to various Arab countries in one form or another, will they be able to rule? Will they be able to rebuild the government in order to control it? Today, they rule in Tunisia during a transitional phase. Will they be up to the responsibility, or will their policy be as their competitors believe? The study will address the transitional phase in Tunisia and its most important outcomes: the Islamists' rise to power, and the most important challenges they face in their first experience of rule in an open country (with a high educational level) like Tunisia, in an evaluation of this experience, which will be addressed in two axes: