The Subject of the Shar‘i Ruling and the Role of the Jurist in Its Determination

Abstract

Submission date: 12/10/2025

Acceptance date: 22/10/2025

Publication date: 30/12/2025

This research addresses the topic of Islamic legal rulings (hukm shar'i), which has received only limited attention in jurisprudential and legal theory studies, despite its importance in the process of legal deduction. The subject of Islamic legal rulings is divided into three categories: First, purely objective matters: These are external, objective matters not subject to legal, customary, or linguistic considerations; rather, they are related to God Almighty as the Creator, not as the Lawgiver. Second, legally derived matters: These are matters whose knowledge depends on the Lawgiver's pronouncements, such as prayer, fasting, and the like. Defining the general subject in these two categories is the responsibility of the jurist, while determining the external instance is the responsibility of the individual obligated to follow Islamic law.

 Third, customary and linguistic derived matters: These are of two types: 1- Matters that are customary and have been endorsed by the Lawgiver, with modifications to some of their limits and conditions to align with Islamic law. This is prevalent in all transactions, such as buying and selling, leasing, and the like. The ruling for this category is the same as for the previous two. 2- The subject matter must be customary or linguistic, and its general title appears in the legal texts without any specification of that general subject matter, such as the terms "good things" and "bad things," "righteousness" and "benevolence," "singing" and "homeland," "land" and "treasure." There are two opinions regarding this category. The first is that defining it is the responsibility of the jurist; thus, following a legal opinion (taqlid) is permissible in this case—while acknowledging that these subjects in themselves are not subject to following a legal opinion, but rather become subject to following based on the rulings related to them—while the application is the responsibility of the individual. The second opinion is that defining it is not the responsibility of the jurist; therefore, following a legal opinion is not permissible in this case. According to this opinion, the ruling for this category differs from all the previous categories.v